



Royal United Services Institute  
of Victoria Inc.

Promoting National Security and Defence

*A Constitutional Body of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*

Patron: The Honourable Alex Chernov AO QC  
Governor of Victoria



Victoria Barracks  
Ground Floor 'H' Block  
256-310 St Kilda Road  
Southbank, Victoria 3006

Phone: (03) 9282 5918  
Fax: (03) 9282 5857  
Email: [rusi.vic@defence.gov.au](mailto:rusi.vic@defence.gov.au)

ABN 46 648 764 477

## RUSI VIC NEWSLETTER

Volume 13 Issue 1 – March 2014

Editor: Martin Holme

ISSN 1446 – 4527




### LUNCHTIME ADDRESS

**Defence Plaza – 661 Bourke Street  
1200 – Auditorium One  
Thursday 27 March**

**Professor Peter Edwards, AM**

### *Australia and the Vietnam War*



Peter Edwards is a writer, historian and biographer, who has published extensively on Australian and international history and politics. Peter is currently an Adjunct Professor at the Alfred Deakin Research Institute of Deakin University, Melbourne.

Peter is probably best known as the Official Historian of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-75 (Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam). He was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) for his work as general editor of the nine-volume series and author of the volumes dealing with strategy and diplomacy, *Crises and Commitments* (1992) and *A Nation at War* (1997).

The Vietnam War was Australia's longest and most controversial military commitment of the twentieth century, ending in humiliation for the US and its allies with the downfall of South Vietnam. The war provoked deep divisions in Australian society and politics, particularly since for the first time young men were conscripted for overseas service in a highly contentious ballot system.

In this landmark book, Peter Edwards skilfully unravels the complexities of the global Cold War, decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and Australian domestic politics to provide new, often surprising, answers to these questions.

Told through the experiences of politicians, diplomats, military leaders, protesters, and soldiers and their families, this book is much more than a war history: it is a major contribution to understanding Australia as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Copies of the book will be available both before and following the presentation.

**Time:** Address 12.00 pm to 1.00 pm,  
Coffee and Tea from 11.30 am

**Entrance fee:** \$10.00

For security reasons please advise the Office, of your attendance by email to [martin.holme@defence.gov.au](mailto:martin.holme@defence.gov.au) or phone 9282 5918 by 5pm Tuesday 25 March. These names are provided to Security to issue Access Passes. If your name is not on the list you will experience a delay in gaining access.

Remember to bring a photo ID with you.

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### March Newsletter

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#### Cyberlinks

RUSI AUST (inc Victoria)	<a href="http://www.rusi.org.au">www.rusi.org.au</a>
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Department of Veteran's Affairs	<a href="http://www.dva.gov.au">www.dva.gov.au</a>
Shrine of Remembrance	<a href="http://www.shrine.org.au">www.shrine.org.au</a>

## From The President: Commander Warren Kemp RFD, RANR



You will recall that our first Intern, Brad Johnston, has been with us for several months and has now completed his second year at Deakin University. He is studying towards the Degree of Bachelor of International Studies and this has included a period of two months in China at Nanking University, returning in January with a much clearer understanding of local pronunciation of the language! He has been involved in several projects for RUSI Victoria and, in particular, with the recording of oral history from a number of our senior members. We look forward to his continuing involvement and contribution to the Institute in the future.

I am very pleased to record that we have now enrolled our second Intern, Kirill Kovalenko, who has been in Melbourne with his family for many years. He is a student at the University of Melbourne and in May will graduate with the Degree of Master of International Relations on completion of his internship with our Institute. He has a number of interests relating to defence and national security and has started a project on the topical subject of amphibious capability and operations in the Australian setting.

The February address was given by Dr John Blaxland who has spoken to us on several occasions. His presentations have always been received with great interest. On this occasion, the subject was his recent book 'The Australian Army – From Whitlam to Howard'. This engendered much interest once again and was followed by questions and answers for an enlightening session that lasted half an hour.

Our next address on 27 March will be given by another distinguished historian, Professor Peter Edwards, on the subject of 'Australia and the Vietnam War'. This will interest many of our members and should not be missed.

The Royal Australian Navy celebrated Foundation Day on 1 March, having been formed by the new Commonwealth in 1901 and on the same day as the Australian Army. Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell was the traditional 'Father of the Navy' and the day was celebrated at a Luncheon with the Creswell Oration given by the Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Tim Barrett. I was pleased to represent RUSI VIC at this event.

We have a small number of active volunteers who make a great contribution to the wellbeing of the Institute and give freely of their time and expertise. Their contributions are gratefully acknowledged by me personally and by the Institute, but we can always use more willing hands! If you would like to become part of our effective team, please contact me or a member of the Council and we will be able to utilize whatever time you may have to spare.

I think that 2014 will be a very good year for RUSI Victoria with an innovative new program, an enhanced library and new premises which I encourage you to visit at your earliest opportunity! In addition, the principal aim of the Institute is to promote discussion in the community about matters of National Security and Defence, so do not keep the Institute to yourself, but bring along your friends, relatives and colleagues so that they can also share in the benefits of belonging to this important educational institution.

Yours aye,  
Warren



Dr John Blaxland 'fields' questions.

## From The Secretary

### Captain Martin Holme

I hope everyone enjoyed the Christmas/New Year break. The Office officially opened towards the end of January and we have been busy gearing up for 2014.

A good program of Lunchtime Addresses is developing under the diligent guidance of Councillor, Colonel Marcus Fielding. The outline of this program appears further down this page. Please note in your diaries.

There is a move afoot to resurrect the Victoria Barracks Guide Tours so that the general public can again participate. The Tour Guides are currently depleted in numbers and are keen to recruit new Guides. It was thought that our Membership might prove to be a fertile ground for such interested persons.

Training will, of course, be provided and it could be a truly fascinating and rewarding experience. Anybody interested should contact me and I will pass your name and contact details on to the guides.

#### Future Program Dates

- |                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| 27 March            | Lunchtime Address at Defence Plaza –<br>Dr Peter Edwards AM<br><br><i>Australia and the Vietnam War</i>   |
| 24 April            | Lunchtime Address at Defence Plaza –<br>SQNLDR Hugh Dolan<br><br><i>Gallipoli's Air War</i>   |
| 29 May<br>confirmed | Blamey Oration – Speaker and venue to be<br>confirmed   |
| 26 June             | Lunchtime Address at Defence Plaza –<br>Mr Tom Trumble<br><br><i>Rescue at 2100 Hours</i>   |
| 31 July             | RADM Tim Barrett AO – Commander<br>Australian Fleet<br>(To be confirmed)  |
| 28 August           | Lunchtime Address at Defence Plaza –<br>Professor Marilyn Lake, University<br>Of Melbourne<br><br><i>The Militarisation of Australian History</i> |
| 25 September        | Lunchtime Address at Defence Plaza –<br>Dr David Wright-Neville<br><br><i>Terrorism and the Threat to Australia</i>                               |

#### New Members

Since our last issue we welcome the following new Members:

Mr Frank Millen; Mr Michael Filius, Mr John Curren OAM.

## WANTED!

### VICTORIA BARRACK'S TOUR GUIDES

#### Become a Victoria Barracks Tour Guide

**Volunteers Required  
Training Provided**

**Interested?  
Contact Martin Holme**

**03 9282 5918 or martin.holme  
@defence.gov.au**



#### Geelong Branch Notes:

' The year commenced with a most enjoyable Dinner Meeting held on Monday February 17 featuring Dr Ross McMullin speaking on his recent book "Farewell Dear People"

Looking ahead, the next Dinner Meeting is to be held at The Geelong Club, 74 Brougham Street, Geelong on Monday March 17 commencing at 1830, with a Guest Speaker to be advised; following on the date for the Anzac Dinner has been moved to Monday April 14, due to our normal monthly Dinner date being Easter Monday.

Further information will be provided in upcoming Newsletters.'

## America and Australian Defence Strategy

Albert Einstein once observed that doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different result is a definition of folly. As the West's invasion of Afghanistan approaches its bitter conclusion, Einstein might well have been referring to our preferred military strategy for the past half-century.

Four times American-led armies have invaded and occupied foreign countries, and four times the model has failed, in Vietnam, Iraq (twice), and Afghanistan. Given that evidence, it seems that Western military staffs and academies have been fortresses of obsolete ideas rather than agents of strategic innovation.

Presumably once the dust has settled after Afghanistan, Australia's political and military leaders will review our national defence strategy.

Former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates may have inadvertently identified the essential start-point for any such review in his new book, "Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War", in which he notes disapprovingly that President Barack Obama "came to distrust" his Army, its commanders, and its strategy.

Notwithstanding Gates' censure, Obama seems to have a point - Afghanistan has, after all, been a political, economic, military, and social disaster. The central question those responsible must answer is this: Why has the West persisted in invading and occupying foreign territories as its preferred military strategy for fifty years when, as the evidence clearly shows, the model is broken?

The failure of contemporary Western strategic thought has two main causes.

First, simply put, the era has gone in which predominantly white, predominantly European, predominantly Christian armies could stampede around the world invading countries their governments either don't like or want to change. In the global village of the twenty-first century that kind of mentality is obsolete. Countries and interest groups connected by instantaneous communications, travel, trade, finance, and shared individual (as opposed to national) interests no longer accept the assumption of Western superiority that shaped the preceding 500 years of the international order. Today, for example, our *expeditionary war* is someone else's *invasion*. The shift in terminology is both instructive and profound.

Second, the subjects of occupation have learnt how to exact costs that are too high for liberal-democratic societies to bear in situations that do not represent a threat to their national survival. The kinds of casualty rates accepted so carelessly by British, French, and German generals in World War I would be intolerable today. Thus, while US-led armies might not have been defeated on the battlefield in the traditional sense in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as body bags continued

to be sent home, they were conclusively defeated on the field of public opinion.

Simultaneously, the economics of occupation have become an own goal for invaders. For instance, no Western general can credibly explain why the most technologically-advanced armies the world has ever known should have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars trying (unsuccessfully) to counter improvised explosive devices - that is, cheap, home-made bombs used by socially primitive opponents. To put it another way, in each of those "expeditionary" wars, the West's apparently technologically and sociologically inferior opponents have been able to define the nature of the fighting, a situation that seems to defy logic - well, habitual military logic, anyway.

Strategy must be the start-point for any analysis of these failed campaigns. The West's declaratory strategy in Afghanistan was the fashionable notion of counter-insurgency warfare - COIN in the military vernacular. COIN was by no means a new concept, but its proponents asserted that a "modern application" would be ideally suited to Afghanistan. In fact, this latest iteration turned out to be nothing more than a case of the emperor's new clothes - of a theory lacking intellectual credibility and, worse still, common sense.

General David Petraeus was the US commander in Afghanistan during a critical phase of the invasion. Described as an expert in COIN, Petraeus at the time enjoyed enormous popular and political support, even though he was representative of a generation of Western army officers whose experience in the field was one of repeated failure.

The irony continues. Petraeus was also a principal author of the American Army's manual of counter-insurgency warfare, a booklet that had acquired near-mythic status among insiders. But according to Vietnam veteran, now academic, Andrew Bacevich, the manual was so vague and self-serving as to be meaningless. Bacevich's analysis was validated by the confusion that has characterised US military operations in Afghanistan. Allegedly agile and flexible, in practice, Petraeus's so-called "modern application" of counter-insurgency warfare was reliant on the nineteenth-century dogma of mass, occupation, and seizing and holding ground. Not so much a strategy as a cult, it related to a world order that no longer exists.

If Australia is to salvage anything from the wreckage of Afghanistan, a vigorous public review of our defence strategy must be conducted. That review would profit from the application of President Obama's justified scepticism towards the process by which Western strategy is developed and advocated.

**Alan Stephens**

*Dr Alan Stephens is a Canberra-based historian, and a former RAAF pilot*

*(Note: RUSI encourages debate on Defence issues but does not take an official position - the views expressed in this article are those of the author. Ed.)*

## Defence and Industry Assistance

Defence spending will be under pressure in the 2014 Budget, and we can anticipate strong measures to achieve efficiency in ADF operations, and heightened efforts to get the best value in spending on capital equipment. A new White Paper will balance strategy and risk in the perceived strategic environment, with force structure and ability to pay.

The percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocated to defence is a measure commonly used to compare countries. Of the developed countries the US spends the most with 4.2-4.7% GDP. It also has the largest GDP. Within countries the %GDP is used to make comparisons with other government expenditure categories, and to track defence expenditure over the years. The Rudd-Gillard government planned an increase from 1.8% GDP to 2%. When in the 2012-13 budget defence was cut to 1.57% GDP most defence commentators raised serious concern. The lowest level since 1938! The Abbott government has promised a return to 2% sometime in the future.

Governments also use a percentage of current expenditure to indicate the growth of defence spending, say 'an increase of 3% in real terms for the next 5 years'. Despite the fact that the percentage of GDP reveals nothing about defence strategy, force structure or preparedness, it is a routinely quoted figure in the defence debate, particularly by politicians anxious to emphasise their commitment.

Quickly changing defence outlays in peacetime is relatively difficult as there is a high level of non-discretionary expenditure. Discretionary expenditure includes the capital equipment programs which are usually easier to defer than advance. Big ticket items are aircraft, war ships, submarines, patrol boats and armoured military vehicles.

With the exception of the aircraft types that have been assembled in Australia, all ADF aircraft are manufactured overseas. This is a common world situation when only major powers can afford to manufacture large or high-end military aircraft. What remains of our aerospace industry is devoted to parts manufacture, niche aerospace products and repair and maintenance. Australia still has the capability of building ships, submarines, patrol boats and military vehicles.

Essential Australian Defence Industry capabilities are to be able to manufacture high usage items like small arms and ammunition, and to be able to maintain, service, repair, modify, and adapt the ADF's major weapons systems.

We have moved on from the wars of attrition thinking of 50 years ago when major weapons systems were simpler, cheaper and quicker to make. There are now no strategic reasons to manufacture major defence systems in Australia.

Defence contracts to manufacture in Australia are politically sensitive at both federal and state government levels, and state governments are acutely aware of the associated employment opportunities. Generally manufacture is uneconomic because as a single customer the ADF does not require sufficient numbers to permit the economies of scale which are a critical cost determinant, and export markets are unlikely.

The government has recently abandoned supporting car manufacture in Australia predominantly because it is of insufficient scale to be economic. The same argument could apply to the manufacture of defence capital equipment.

If the government wants to build in Australia to create jobs or save jobs in particular locations, the cost premium above overseas sourcing is usually very significant. Attribution of this amount to defence, results in a distorted view of defence spending. The amount of the premium should be properly charged to the Industry Portfolio. This will provide transparency in the defence budget both for internal resource allocation and external comparisons. It may also make clearer the cost of supporting jobs in various industries, and ensure that the taxpayer gets the best value from industry support.

If there are not sound defence reasons for manufacture in Australia and local manufacture is not competitive, but the government requires local production for 'national development' reasons, then the price premium should properly be sourced from the Industry portfolio and not the Defence portfolio. The opportunity cost of the defence industry jobs within the Industry portfolio is also made clear. A State government may decide that more jobs could be supported if the subsidy was applied to another industry.

The cost break-up needs to be determined on a whole of life cycle basis not acquisition cost alone. Greater budget transparency should enable best value to be obtained for Defence and also for Industry.

**Mike Rawlinson**

*Air Commodore (Retd) Mike Rawlinson is a former Victorian Chairman of the Defence and Industry Study Course.*




RAN Collins Class Submarine

## Book Review

Max Boot

### **Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present**

*Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013; 750 pp.;  
ISBN 9780871404244 (hardcover); RRP \$44.95*



Max Boot is a very capable historian and in *Invisible Armies* he traces guerrilla warfare and terrorism from antiquity to the present, narrating nearly thirty centuries of unconventional military conflicts.

Boot masterfully guides the reader from the first insurgencies in the ancient world, through the Jewish rebellion against the Roman Empire to the horrors of the French-Indochina War and the shadowy, post-9/11 battlefields of today.

He demonstrates that, far from being the exception, loosely organized partisan or guerrilla warfare has been the dominant form of military conflict throughout history.

Since ancient times, individual radicals, disadvantaged groups, and angry populations under occupation have resorted to terrorism and guerrilla warfare as the only military means available when facing stronger and more conventional forces. Hiding in the shadows and emerging to attack where they are least expected they seek to cause enough protracted pain to persuade their enemies to give up.

Boot's coverage is comprehensive, taking in revolutionary movements and anti-colonial resistance campaigns, special forces working behind enemy lines and large-scale counterinsurgency operations, the revolts of Bar Kokhba and Robert the Bruce, the political violence of John Brown and the Ku Klux Klan, as well as charismatic guerrilla leaders such as T.E. Lawrence and Che Guevara.

Boot breaks up this grand historical sweep into eight books that group several historical case studies with common elements. He sustains the reader's interest with lively writing and sharp characterizations of many memorable characters - from Italian nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi to the 'Quiet American' Edward Lansdale - including several anecdotes on the personal hygiene and sex lives of some guerrilla leaders. *Invisible Armies* includes a table of insurgencies since 1775 (noting his predominant American audience) as well as 70 illustrations and eight maps.

*Invisible Armies* includes a significant number of terrorism case studies which Boot argues is distinct from guerrilla warfare largely on the basis that terrorists hope through a few spectacular attacks to trigger a revolution. His observation that "Unlike guerrilla warfare, the most ancient form of warfare, terrorism is strikingly modern" is insightful. He believes that terrorism has been made possible by the development of four relative recent phenomena: destructive and portable weaponry, such as dynamite and pistols; the mass media, which publicizes their attacks; literacy, which enables terrorist groups to recruit educated operatives; and secular ideologies that focus on nationalistic and socioeconomic issues.

Boot deduces that although guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have had their successes, the strong more often prevail over the weak. But he also identifies that invisible armies work best when they have support from another state, are able to build up political support, and link up with (or become) even more visible conventional forces.

Boot concludes his historical analysis with a chapter titled "Implications" in which he derives twelve observations about guerrillas and guerrilla warfare. He teases each of these throughout the book. The twelve observations are historically sound and would be useful to a practitioner in developing doctrine and strategies to counter-insurgencies. They include: "The most important development in guerrilla warfare in the last two hundred years has been the rise of public opinion" and "Establishing legitimacy is vital for any successful insurgency or counter-insurgency - and, in modern times, that is hard to achieve for a foreign force or government." As ever, though, the first challenge is to understand what sort of war you are actually fighting - not necessarily easy in this post-colonial, post-Cold War world where the role of the state is waning and technology has an increasing influence.

While *Invisible Armies* ends its analysis at around 2010 and does not consider the events of the 'Arab Spring' or Syria over the last few years, or indeed the 'end-game' in Afghanistan, it is a valuable contribution to this field of study and has appeal to both military historians and military practitioners.


**Marcus Fielding**

## Book Review:

Peter Plowman

### **Voyage to Gallipoli,**

Dural NSW: Rosenberg Publishing, 2013. (304 pp, bibliography, index, B&W photos; RRP \$34.95)



As we approach the anniversaries for the First World War, we can expect many books about Australia's part in that cataclysmic conflict. The first convoy took the greatest assemblage of Australian & New Zealand troops to the war and it did so through waters that were potentially dangerous.

Peter Plowman, a maritime historian, has written about Pacific liners, migrant ships and trans-Tasman shipping. In this volume he tells the story of this important convoy and gives it a wider context. The period he covers is from the outset of the war until the Gallipoli landing.

The lesser known troop deployments to Thursday Island, German Samoa and German New Guinea are given good coverage. He examines the fleets in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, both German and Allied. The factors that led to the convoy are discussed as well as the need to put Australian and New Zealand ships together.

The raising of the AIF is described. Government vacillation, troops embarked and swiftly disembarked, hasty taking up of ships from trade, even hastier modifications to ready them for trooping, the effect of a change of Australian government are all put in context. The convoy assembled piecemeal, the orderly departure, the thin veil of secrecy and censorship are outlined.

The famous *Sydney Emden* encounter is well described. The reasons for the choice of the first convoy's Egyptian destination are made clear. The second contingent is similarly covered. Next, the deployment from Egypt to Gallipoli is outlined. An appendix lists the details and fates of both the Australian and New Zealand transports and completes the story.

Plowman has made very good use of many well-chosen first-hand accounts and has selected a wide range of photographs. His research has been good and his affection for the topic is obvious.

This is a well-written and informative book and an important contribution to understanding the begging of the First World war for Australia and New Zealand.

I think one can only be greatly impressed by the capability of the naval, merchant naval and military staffs that planned the raising of the AIF and NZEF and the many processes that led to the achievement of the convoys. Our forefathers were formidable achievers!

On 21<sup>st</sup> October 2014 Victorians will be invited to commemorate the departure of the flagship of the first convoy, HMAT [His Majesty's Australian Transport] *Orvieto*, otherwise known as A3. The ship carried 1457 men and women to war - its manifest is readily accessible. It is understood that relatives of those who sailed on what they perhaps thought was this 'great adventure' will be especially invited to the event at Station Pier. It will be, for these and many others, a visible reminder of the departure of so many. Fewer returned, and even fewer were unharmed.

We are particularly grateful to the publishers for this review copy that now forms part of our Library.

**Mike O'Brien**

### **Donations to your Library Fund are Tax Deductible**

Help to maintain the Institute's Library as the best collection in Victoria on defence and military related subjects by donating to your RUSI VIC Library Fund. The RUSI VIC Library Fund is a Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) approved by the Australian Taxation Office, and monetary gifts to the Fund over \$2 are tax deductible by the donor.

Please make cheques to the 'RUSI VIC Inc Library Fund'. Receipts will be provided.

## Thoughts on the International Fleet Review Sydney 2013

(A Letter to RUSI Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Canada)

No doubt the Fleet Review received some coverage on Canadian television, and although the fireworks were undoubtedly world class, its true significance was the commemoration of the ceremonial entry into Sydney Harbour of the first Australian Fleet Unit (now we would probably call it a task group) on 4 October 1913. The Fleet Unit consisted of a battle cruiser, three cruisers and three destroyers, and one of the destroyers, HMAS *Warrego*, had been built in Australia. Could anything similar have happened in Canada in 1913?



Across the Undefined Frontier from the United States, with its Monroe Doctrine, and with the Royal Navy controlling the oceans, Canada showed no interest in naval defence until the rise of the German Navy threatened British naval power. In their much more exposed position, the Australian colonies (unfederated until 1901) felt no such sense of security and all developed their own navies. The Victorian Navy was the largest of the colonies' navies, and included HMVS *Cerberus*, the most powerful ship in the Southern Hemisphere when she arrived at Port Phillip in 1871.

The British Government felt that it was spending too much on Empire defence, and starting with the First Colonial Conference in 1887, proposed that the dominions make financial contribution to the Royal Navy. This was unpalatable to Canadian and Australian nationalism. At the 1897 Colonial Conference Prime Minister Laurier declined to commit Canada to any form of naval collaboration. The Canadian position was that the construction of the Halifax and Esquimalt dry docks, and the availability of the Canadian Pacific and Inter-colonial Railways for the shipment of Admiralty stores and personnel to the Pacific coast was an adequate contribution.

As the presence of the Royal Navy squadron based at Sydney was felt essential to the security of Australia, in 1901 it was agreed to contribute £200,000 a year towards the upkeep of this squadron.

As Germany built more battleships ('dreadnoughts' after 1905), and a ship building race developed, the British Government proposed that the dominions provide funding for dreadnoughts. At the time, only Canada paid nothing as Laurier felt that "...acceptance of the proposals was an important departure from the principle of colonial self-government". At the 1907 Conference, for the first time the Admiralty accepted that small, local naval forces (destroyers and submarines) would be useful but that the main defence should be left to the Royal Navy.

1909 was a year of decision. Early in the year Australia allocated funding for three destroyers: two to be built in the UK and one to be pre-fabricated and shipped to Australia for assembly at Cockatoo Island Dockyard.

In March a resolution passed the Canadian House of Commons approving the establishment of a Canadian Naval Service. The Admiralty said that the smallest fleet unit recommended consisted of an armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines at an initial cost of £3.7 million. The smaller dominions were opposed to 'tin pot' navies, but Canada and Australia felt that strategy must take second place to constitutional government and that they must have their own navies. Australia, with bipartisan support, agreed to fund the recommended fleet unit, and one of the cruisers and three of the destroyers would be built in Australia.

In Canada politics intervened. The Nationalists in Quebec were opposed to any form of naval defence, and the Conservatives under Borden thought that it would take too long to build an effective navy and wished to pay for three dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy instead. Laurier steered a middle course and the government called for tenders for the building of an 11 ship fleet unit (five cruisers and six destroyers), with all ships to be built in Canada. Before any tender was accepted, however, a general election intervened at which Laurier was defeated and the new government, under Borden, decided not to accept any of the tenders. The new Conservative government proposed to take no action on the future of the Navy, but introduced a Naval Aid bill which would provide funding for three dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy. This bill was eventually defeated in the Senate with the result that the Royal Canadian Navy entered the First World War with only the two old training cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow* and two submarines purchased by the premier of British Columbia; neither were the dreadnoughts built for the Royal Navy.

A navy that could have had modern cruisers and destroyers, just like the Royal Australian Navy, was thus restricted to a coastal force of patrol vessels. A consensus was never reached between Imperialists in the Conservative party – who wanted dreadnoughts – and the Nationalists who wanted no naval policy at all, and as a result the sensible policy of Laurier failed to build a strong Royal Canadian Navy.

**Roger Buxton**

## Library Notes:

The library starts the New Year with the receipt of a number of new books submitted by publishers. Some of these books are listed below:

War in Afghanistan: A short history of 80 wars in Afghanistan and the N.W. Frontier 1839 to 2011

Author Kevin Baker. Note: Reviewer sought for this book

Mons, Anzac and Kut: By an MP.

Author Lt. Col. The Hon. Aubrey Herbert MP

An Unqualified Success: The extraordinary life of Allan Percy Fleming.

Author Peter Golding. Note: Reviewer sought for this book

My Year in the Forgotten War: Under the UN Flag.

Author Derek G Sharp

Out of the Mountains: The coming age of the Urban Guerrilla.

Author David Kilcullen.

The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard.

Author John Blaxland.

To Salamaua. Author Phillip Bradley

The Hard Slog: Australians in the Bougainville Campaign, 1944-45. Author Karl James

Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War. Author Garth Pratten

The Architect of Victory: The military career of Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Horton Berryman. Author Peter J Dean

Wireless at War: Developments in military and clandestine radio 1895-2012

Author Peter R Jensen. Note: Reviewer sought for this book.

A Soldier's Soldier: A Biography of Lt. Gen Sir Thomas Daly. Author Jeffrey Grey.

Members who would like to volunteer to review any of the books above, but particularly those noted, please contact either Maj. Gen Mike O'Brien or the Librarian Brian Surtees. An email to the library ([library.rusivic@gmail.com](mailto:library.rusivic@gmail.com)) would suffice.

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**Brian Surtees**

