



**Royal United Services Institute
of
South Australia Inc**

A Constituent Body of the
Royal United Services Institute of Australia Inc

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Promoting National Security and Defence

RUSI-SA

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NEWSLETTER

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PRESIDENT'S REPORT

FOR VALOUR

The Royal United Services Institute of South Australia joins all Australians in saluting Trooper Mark Donaldson on his award of the Victoria Cross, our nation's highest military honour. The award recognises his most conspicuous gallantry in the face of the enemy during operational service in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan.

While we now frequently hear of the professional daring of our highly respected servicemen and servicewomen in this theatre of operations, the selfless bravery of Trooper Donaldson, under accurate and relentless enemy fire, reflects a level of commitment and courage truly worthy of the spirit of past heroic VC winners, whose revered ranks he now joins. Trooper Donaldson is the first Australian to be awarded the Victoria Cross in almost forty years and, in a display of typical modesty, he is quoted as saying, *"I don't see myself as a hero. I was in Afghanistan just doing my job. My training and my instincts took over on the day."*

We think that history may judge him otherwise.

Congratulations Trooper Mark Donaldson, VC. You have served our country with great distinction and rightly deserve the honoured place you now assume in Australia's history.

MONTHLY LUNCHEONS

Monday 2 March 2009

Speaker: Ms Helen Bulis

Regional Director South Australia

Australian Customs Service

**Topic: The Customs Service:
Managing the Security and Integrity of
Australia's Borders**

All members are invited to attend our luncheons. Indeed you are encouraged to invite partners, friends and colleagues to join us and, if they like what they see and hear, to nominate them for membership. Please book in advance. If you are unsure whether or not your name is on the booking list, please check!

Cancellations must be reported to the RUSI-SA Office by midday of the Friday before the lunch. Subsequent cancellations will attract a fee of \$20. The caterers must be notified of the number attending by then and that number must be paid for.

The dress code for the luncheon is neat casual, taking into consideration weather conditions. We usually assemble in Building 34A, Keswick Barracks, Keswick, at approximately 11.30 am for drinks and good fellowship. Members are asked to be seated by 12 noon when our President welcomes members and guests and lunch is served. The cost of the buffet is \$20. We also conduct a raffle to help cover expenses. Our caterer has agreed to provide vegetarian meals and sweets for diabetics, but these must be ordered before midday on the Thursday before the lunch.

For those who do not have time to enjoy lunch, but wish to hear the lecture, chairs are provided around the perimeter of the hall. Please be seated before 12.55 pm, as the guest speaker will be introduced at 1.00 pm. The address is of

about 30 to 35 minutes duration with 15 minutes for questions, after which coffee or tea is available. We aim to complete the program by 2.00 pm.

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SOCIAL CALENDAR 2009

Please make a note of the following social activities planned for 2009 in your diaries.

Sunday 17 May – BBQ on the lawns by Bld 160 (TBC)

Friday 26 June - Dining In Night

Sunday 23 August – Winter Carvery, Flagstaff Hill Golf Club

Friday 23 November – The Sundowner

MEMBERSHIP

Mr Paul Graham Brown has been duly elected as a member of the RUSI-SA in accordance with the Rules of the Institute.

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

Monday 3 November 2008

Ms Amanda Schiller

Research Assistant, Centre for International Risk, School of International Studies, University of South Australia

Topic: Managing the Threat of Jemaah Islamiyah Into the Future: What Role for Australia?



Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Indonesian radical Islamist terrorist group, formed in the early 1990s by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. Their stated goal is the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia, which they anticipate will lead to the creation of a broader Southeast Asian Caliphate, covering Indonesia, the southern Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and southern Thailand. They have no problem with using violence or terrorism to achieve this goal.

From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, a significant number of individuals from South East Asia trained in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region with Al Qaida linked militants. Many of these individuals went on to become senior members of JI. The individual relationships formed during the formative years of JI went on to provide the basis for an ad-hoc relationship between the two groups. As well as human links between JI and Al Qaida, there have also been financial links. The Bali 2002 terrorist attacks were financed by Al Qaida. As a result of the international rise in vigilance regarding terrorist financing and trans-national flows of monies, the links between the two groups are no longer strong.

Since 2000, JI has carried out eight major terrorist attacks, some of which involved simultaneous or sequential attacks on multiple targets. The most significant of JI's attacks include: Bali (2002), Jakarta Marriott Hotel (2003), Australian Embassy in Jakarta (2004), and a second attack in Bali (2005). In all, more than 270 people have been killed and over 800 have been injured as a result of JI attacks. At its peak, JI had a presence in Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia. This presence is now largely limited to Indonesia, with a small number thought to be in the Philippines. For this reason I will focus largely on Indonesia throughout this presentation.

WHY IS THIS ISSUE IMPORTANT FOR AUSTRALIA?

Australia should be concerned about regional terrorism and JI in particular, for a number of reasons. The Bali bombings of 2002 alone killed 202 people, of which 88 were Australians – many more were injured, or affected in some other way – not to mention the other attacks which have affected Australians.

Australia has been explicitly named as a target by key JI figures. This is partly due to Australia's alliance with the United States, as well as Australian military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The disrespectful behaviour of some Australian tourists in Indonesia, particularly in Bali, has also been cited as a justification for targeting Australia.

The Australian government was directly attacked in the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta. Other attacks in which Australia was to be a target have been disrupted at the planning stage including a planned attack on the Australian High Commission (along with a number of other Western diplomatic missions) in Singapore, which was disrupted in December 2001.

Further, it is known that JI had a contingent of members in Australia. This group was very small, and played a mainly fund-raising role. It has since been successfully disbanded, but it is a reminder that the threat of JI is very close to home. Essentially, JI is, and seeks to be, a threat to Australians and Australian interests.

In addition to JI being a direct threat to Australia and Australians, it is in our interest to ensure that Indonesia remains stable. Indonesia is Australia's nearest neighbour; our thirteenth largest trading partner, with two-way trade valued at \$10.3 billion in 2007; over 400 Australian companies operate in Indonesia; and there are thousands of Australians living, working and travelling in Indonesia at any given time. Instability in Indonesia or the Southeast Asian region more generally, might have negative ramifications for Australia, including lost trade and business opportunities, the potential for increased illegal migration to Australia, and the potential for increased radicalism in Australia.

To this effect, there are both diplomatic and pragmatic reasons that Australia should want to cooperate with Indonesia in the management of the JI threat. This is an important opportunity to engage with the countries of Southeast Asia, and to strengthen and shape our relationships with those countries in a positive way.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE SO FAR?

Indonesia is in a delicate position regarding how to address Islamist terrorism. Eighty-eight percent of the Indonesian population is Muslim. It is a new democracy still finding its feet after decades under Suharto's New Order regime. Consequently, Indonesia has needed to take a cautious approach in responding to JI. It must be very careful not to ostracize or target Muslims through its counter terrorism efforts, as this presents the danger that moderate Muslims, who make up the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims, may become radicalised. Indonesia must also take care to protect its infantile democracy. In this spirit, the Indonesian government has avoided a military response; instead, preferring a response focused on police work and intelligence gathering. To this effect the Indonesian government has established an elite counter-terrorism arm of the Indonesian police, known as Detachment 88. This group has been very successful in arresting and prosecuting Indonesian terrorists. The government has avoided implementing draconian anti-terrorism laws, such as a Malaysian or Singaporean-style Internal Security Act. It has however introduced some legal reforms relating to counter-terrorism, which enable police increased powers of detention –

terrorism suspects may now be held without charge for seven days (extendable to 30 days), rather than the standard 24 hours for non-terrorism related cases. The Indonesian government has been relatively lenient on those convicted terrorists who cooperate throughout the investigation and prosecution process. The Indonesian government recognises the value of the intelligence that these individuals can provide, and it rewards their cooperation with leniency.

As part of this philosophy, Indonesia has implemented a scheme of using rehabilitated and reformed JI members to 'convert' other members of the organisation, the philosophy being that in the eyes of JI members, individuals who are, or have been members of JI have a great deal more legitimacy than a moderate Muslim cleric or a police person or government official. The two most significant individuals involved in this program are Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron. Abbas was the director of JI's training operations in the Philippines, and Imron played a role in the 2002 Bali bombings, and is the brother of Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi.

The degree of caution displayed by the Indonesian government has meant that they have been slow in recognising and responding to the threat of JI, despite having received intelligence from Singapore and other countries at an early stage. The Indonesian government has failed to proscribe JI, citing the point that because the name 'Jemaah Islamiyah' translates to 'Islamic Community', a great number of non-radical Muslims might be ostracized. As a result, the Indonesian Government has been highly criticised by the governments of Singapore, Malaysia and a number of Western countries, as well as the global media, for their slowness and reluctance to act more authoritatively.

Australia has provided more than \$354 million for counter-terrorism capacity building in Southeast Asia. Australian police have worked closely with Indonesian police following terrorist attacks and joint training programs have been established between Australian police and military and their Indonesian and Filipino counterparts. The Australian government has contributed funding for the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and Australia has entered into a number of bilateral agreements with Indonesia

and a number of other states on counter-terrorism cooperation. These include the Australian-Indonesia counter-terrorism Memorandum of Understanding (2002), and the Lombok Treaty (2006), which establish a greater degree of cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, including intelligence sharing.

Australia's role in Southeast Asia is viewed with some suspicion by parts of the Indonesian public, and, for reasons mentioned earlier, this is something that groups like JI set out to exploit. Although JI target Australian interests, they are essentially a domestic Indonesian issue. Australia must respect Indonesian sovereignty, we must avoid being seen as meddling or intrusive, and we must play a mostly unseen role, acting in cooperation with and support for the Indonesian government.

MEASURING SUCCESS: JEMAAH ISLAMIAH'S CURRENT STATUS

The clearest indicator of counter-terrorism success is the absence of terrorist attacks since 2005 – this is a clear break from JI's previously established pattern of one major terrorist attack approximately every 12 months. Furthermore, there have been over 400 JI-related arrests, and over 200 successful prosecutions. Jemaah Islamiyah has been severely limited in its transnational spread, now being largely limited to Indonesia; and we have seen a significant degree of organisational fragmentation within the organisation. There are now at least two distinct factions within JI. The first 'mainstream JI' have recognised that JI's attacks have not been successful in terms of gaining public support for the organisation or in terms of building the strength of the organisation – in fact it has had the opposite effect. JI's attacks have killed many innocent Muslims and the consequent counter-terrorism response has severely damaged JI's membership numbers and capacity. Consequently 'mainstream JI' have shifted their focus from carrying out terrorist attacks to recruiting new members and building the strength of their organisation. This is not to say that they have vowed against using terrorism as a means to achieve their goals. It simply means they will be more discerning in their choice of targets and timing, choosing to carry out attacks only in circumstances that are likely to advance their cause.

All of this means that the capacity of JI has been severely limited since 2002. However, JI is still a threat. There are a number of key individuals still at large, including Noordin Mohammed Top, the leader of radical faction and a key planner of JI's bombings; Dulmatin, a key bomb maker; Umar Patek, who played a role in 2002 Bali bombings; and Mas Selamat bin Kastari, the leader of JI in Singapore who escaped from prison in Singapore earlier this year. JI's focus on recruitment means that they are looking to build future capacity, and they maintain their long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. Therefore, even though the group seems to have been subdued for the present, complacency now could increase the threat in the future.

WHAT IS YET TO BE DONE?

So far focus of the counter-terrorism effort has rightly been on responding to terrorist attacks, detecting and disrupting planned attacks; training camps and bomb-making factories. This critical work has been carried out with a good degree of success. However, this is only part of what needs to be done. While these measures have successfully limited JI's present capacity, the group is now focused on building future capacity through recruitment, building support networks and so on. We must begin to focus on this area – on what has been termed 'the battle for hearts and minds' – if we are to limit JI's capacity to operate into the future.

This will require a hybrid approach involving law enforcement and intelligence measures coupled with preventative social policy, designed to limit the organisation's ability to renew itself. We must continue to address JI's ability to operate, but must also address the root causes of terrorism in Indonesia. There are six key areas, which, if addressed, might significantly impact the capacity of JI to operate into the future:

1. Improve the security of the Indonesian prison system.

There is currently a high level of inmate interaction within Indonesian prisons. This is exploited by JI because incarceration is viewed as an opportunity to recruit new members –

many of whom have shown a willingness to use violence. It is also seen as an opportunity for the more radical members of JI to radicalise the more ambivalent members of the organisation. Therefore inmate separation is required at two levels: firstly JI inmates should be kept apart from non-JI inmates and secondly, radical JI ideologues should be limited in their interactions with less radical JI.

Inmates in Indonesian prisons can often have relatively easy access to mobile phones, laptops, and other devices which enable them to communicate with outside networks. A number of JI inmates write or record sermons or religious messages which are then distributed to the wider JI network. Some, including the Bali bombers, have written books whilst in prison. Improved security is required to limit inmates' access to these resources. Of course, corruption amongst prison staff must be addressed concurrently if any kind of reform is to have any real impact.

2. Address the problem of recruitment in schools run by Jemaah Islamiyah.

JI operates approximately 26 schools across Indonesia, mostly concentrated in Java. The most notable of these is the Al-Mukmin School near Solo, in central Java. This school was started in the 1970s by JI's founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. JI's schools are a key recruiting ground for the organisation. According to the International Crisis Group, part of the problem in the schools is that students graduate with very few useful skills. A significant number end up working as teachers in JI schools. Others join JI and others become a part of the wider support network. There are very limited options for graduates other than these very narrow pathways.

Australia has committed to building 2000 new schools in Indonesia between 2006 and 2009. This will include both secular and Islamic schools. While this is indeed a significant contribution, it is of little value if there is a shortage of well-trained teachers to staff them. It also does little to address the specific problem of recruitment in JI schools. These schools cannot simply be shut down, as the ALP argued a few years ago.

A small measure that might give students of JI

schools some more options when they graduate would be to introduce more comprehensive curriculum requirements on a national level. I am not arguing that this will stop JI teaching its ideology in its schools, or using them to groom future terrorists, but, if it can be enforced, it will give graduates options to pursue pathways *other* than terrorism when they graduate.

3. Limit communal conflict.

JI have been able to exploit communal conflicts in places like Ambon and Poso to their advantage. JI sees these kinds of conflict as an opportunity to stir up religious hatred, and for its members to gain real fighting experience – even the anti-bombing faction tend to see these conflicts as legitimate jihad. JI also use these conflict zones as recruitment grounds, targeting angry Muslims who have shown a predisposition to use violent means to express their views. It is essential that these outbreaks are limited and controlled as much as possible when they occur. To achieve this, it will be necessary to strengthen law and order in the areas prone to this kind of violence, mostly in Eastern Indonesia. Given that outsiders are often brought in to these conflicts to stir up violence and hatred, community leaders and law enforcement officers should single out those who seem to be seeking to exacerbate violence and remove them from the situation. It is also essential to address the underlying social factors that contribute to outbreaks of violence, be they poverty or unemployment, lack of access to resources, and so on. We should encourage inter-faith dialogues and similar measures to increase inter-religious understanding.

4. Improve border security.

JI uses the geography of Southeast Asia to its advantage, easily moving between Indonesia and the Philippines. Admittedly, border security in this region is an enormously difficult job. But with appropriate resources, including high-speed boats or helicopters, appropriate satellite imaging technology, and a sufficient number of appropriately trained personnel, perhaps a better job could be done. Perhaps there is a role for Australia here. Achieving more secure borders in the region will require a great deal of practical cooperation between all the states involved. Corruption must also be addressed in this area if

any changes are to have any significant effect.

5. Further limit Jemaah Islamiyah's ability to finance its operations.

JI currently is able to finance itself through its schools, and a range of small businesses run by its members. These businesses include publishing houses, Islamic clothing stores, mechanic shops and other similar enterprises. While we've done a very good job at limiting the trans-national flow of funding to JI from the Middle East, JI now draws most of its funding from the domestic sources I've just mentioned. It is not terribly expensive to carry out a terrorist attack, so whatever we can do to limit the flow of money to JI will be a valuable achievement.

6. Maintain political freedom and uphold democracy.

Part of the reason JI came about was because of an absence of these two things. If people are able to express their political views freely, and feel that they can affect change through legitimate political channels, they may be less inclined to turn to terrorism and violence to achieve their political goals. Therefore it is essential when carrying out counter-terrorism measures that political freedom, religious freedom and democracy are upheld.

WHAT ROLE FOR AUSTRALIA?

Australia's role in the future of counter-terrorism in the region should be much as it has been since 2002. Australia should be co-operative and engaged, but retain a largely capacity building role. It remains very important that the Indonesians, Filipinos, Singaporeans, Malaysians and Thais take the lead in counter-terrorism in their own countries.

Continue to work with 'SE Asian neighbours to build counter-terrorism capacity.

I mentioned the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement and Training, and a number of other Australian capacity building initiatives. There may be a greater role for Australia in building border security capacity, in building anti-corruption measures, and possibly in teacher training and education policy.

Increase focus on preventative measures through development aid and social policy.

Australia should continue to use its Aid program to improve the education system, provide

employment opportunities and build communities in Indonesia, with particular attention paid to how Aid might be used to limit terrorist recruitment and limit JI's capacity in the future.

Continue to place pressure on the Indonesian government to stop using capital punishment.

The issue of capital punishment is naturally divisive, however, stopping the use of capital punishment in Indonesia is important from a strategic perspective. Allowing radical ideologues, the death penalty may create martyrs who are held up as heroes by their contemporaries and are shown as examples of piety and dedication to young people. It also contributes to the JI argument that the Indonesian government is anti-Islam. These are powerful messages that are very significant in terms of perpetuating support for JI's cause, and in terms of the ability to recruit people willing to carry out suicide attacks and so on. Furthermore, in the case of Islamist terrorist groups who use suicide bombings, fear of death is unlikely to be a deterrent, therefore the deterrent impact of the threat of the death penalty is significantly reduced.

As far as possible, encourage Australians to return to Indonesia.

The Indonesian tourism industry makes up a significant proportion of the Indonesian economy (over five billion US dollars annually) and it has suffered significantly since 2002. Tourist numbers are slowly recovering. The Australian government should, as far as possible, encourage Australians to return to Indonesia. Naturally, the government must fulfill its responsibility to protect Australians overseas, and DFAT travel warnings are an important part of this, but we also need to ensure that they are fair and not excessively cautious. A continuously high level of alert simply results in a 'cry wolf' scenario, in which some people might be tempted to defy the warnings and travel anyway.

Remain alert to other threats in the region and address them concurrently.

There are a numerous other threats in the region, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group in Philippines, political instability in Thailand and the Pacific and other potential threats further afield. We must address these other 'weak spots' concurrently.

Remain alert to the threat in Australia.

Australia is not immune to the threat of domestic terrorism. We have seen instances of home grown terrorism, including in recent years, the Melbourne cell. We must remain alert to this too.

AUSTRALIA DAY HONOURS AND AWARDS

RUSI-SA extends congratulations to the following members for the recognition of their service in the Australia Day Honours and Awards:

Brigadier Timothy James Hanna AM

Raymond Harvey Buttery OAM

Roger Geoffrey Cundell OAM

Donald Raymond Hawking OAM RFD

LIBRARY

Non-fiction

The following book has been added to the library recently. The review was provided by Malcolm Orchard.

“Glorious Summer, The Story Of The Battle Of Britain” by Air Vice-Marshal J.E. (Johnnie) Johnson CB, CBE, DSO, DFC and Wing Commander P.B. (Laddie) Lucas CBE, DSO, DFC.

In this outstanding anthology of the written and spoken word, two of the most distinguished fighter pilots of WWII, Jonnie Johnson and Laddie Lucas, have compiled a gripping account of what Winston Churchill described as 'one of the most decisive battles of history' and the world came to know as the Battle of Britain.

Fifty years on, the drama and immediacy of this classic aerial encounter are captured again in the dispatches of great reporters like Ed Murrow of CBS, Quentin Reynolds and Tom Driberg of the Express. Poetic and personal accounts of the battle are interspersed with the momentous speeches of Churchill, Hitler and Goring, and indisputable evidence of how close Britain came to defeat at the hands of the Luftwaffe can be seen in the impressive collection of official papers and memos, many of which are published here for the first time. Drawing on material from both sides of the war, Johnnie Johnson and Laddie Lucas have taken advantage of their exceptional wartime experience and insight to construct a fascinating and eloquent memorial to the *Glorious Summer* of 1940.

In WWII, Johnnie Johnson became the allies' most successful fighter leader on the Western Front, destroying 38 enemy aircraft while commanding the brilliant Canadian Spitfire formations. He subsequently flew with the USAF during the Korean War in the advanced jet fighting over the north of the country. (After an exceptional service career, Air Vice-Marshal Johnson drew on his extensive wartime experience to write three widely read works on the development of air fighting.)

Laddie Lucas, a pre-war Fleet Street journalist and former MP, retired from the chairmanship of a public company and returned to writing thirteen years ago. *Glorious Summer* is his eighth book. During the war he commanded the top-scoring fighter squadron in the critical air battle for Malta in the spring and summer of 1942. Later he commanded a Spitfire wing in the daylight offensive in the West before leading a Mosquito squadron operating in support of the Allied armies advancing through north-west Europe and into Nazi Germany.

With such a background, Johnnie Johnson and Laddie Lucas are uniquely qualified to compile this enthralling account of the Battle of Britain.

This book was donated to the library by Malcolm Simms.