



**Royal United Services Institute
of
South Australia Inc**

A Constituent Body of the
Royal United Services Institute of Australia Inc

Building 160 Keswick Barracks,
Keswick SA 5035
Tel/Fax: 61 (8) 8305 6378
Office Hours:
Monday and Friday 10am to 4pm
Library also opens on Wednesday

Promoting National Security and Defence

RUSI-SA

Issue No 416

Aug/Sep 2008

NEWSLETTER

RUSI-SA CYBERLINKS

RUSI OF SA EMAIL ADDRESS

rusikes@bigpond.com

RUSI OF AUSTRALIA WEBSITE

<http://www.rusiaust.org>

RUSI FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES WHITEHALL WEBSITE

<http://www.rusi.org>

AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE

<http://www.aspi.org.au>

Patron

*His Excellency Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce
AC CSC RAN Governor of South Australia*

COUNCIL MEMBERS 2008

President:	COL D.Stoba RFD ED (Retd)
Vice Presidents:	BRIG D. Willett AM (Retd) COL N.R. Bergin (Retd)
Councillors:	Mr C.C. Brooks COL Hans Broweleit (Retd) Mr M.J. Gorroick C/Insp F J Leditschke (Retd) CAPT M.J. Orchard RFD ED (Retd)
Representing:	RAN CMDR C. Pritchard ARMY MAJ D. Searles RAAF WGCDR R. Smallwood
Treasurer:	COL L. Thompson AM RFD ED (Retd)
Hon Auditor:	CAPT D. Shorrock (RAAPC)
Secretary/Public Officer:	Elaine Atkinson
Librarian/Hon Editor:	CAPT M.J. Orchard RFD ED (Retd)

PRESIDENT'S REPORT

Luncheon Speaker

Monday 4 Aug 2008

**Professor Stephen Cook,
Director, Defence and Systems Institute,
University of South Australia.**

Topic: "Building Complex Military Systems"

Luncheon Speaker

Monday 1 Sep 2008

**Dr Owen Mace,
Industry Development Executive,
Defence Teaming Centre**

**Topic: "Global Positioning Systems and Their
Military Applications"**

MONTHLY LUNCHEONS

All members are invited to attend our luncheons. Indeed you are encouraged to invite partners, friends and colleagues to join us and, if they like what they see, to nominate them for membership. Please book in advance. If you are unsure whether or not your name is on the booking list, please check!

Cancellations must be reported to the RUSI-SA Office by midday of the Friday before the lunch. Subsequent cancellations will attract a fee of \$20. The caterers must be notified of the number attending by then and that number must be paid for.

The dress code for the luncheon is neat casual, taking into consideration weather conditions. We assemble in Building 34A, Keswick Barracks, Keswick, at approximately 11.30 am for drinks and good fellowship. Members are asked to be seated by 12 noon when our President welcomes members and guests and lunch is served.

The cost of the buffet is \$20. We also conduct a raffle to help cover expenses. Our caterer has agreed to provide vegetarian meals and sweets for diabetics, but these must be ordered before midday on the Thursday before the lunch.

For those who do not have time to enjoy lunch, but wish to hear the lecture, chairs are provided around the perimeter of the hall. Please be seated before 12.55 pm, as the guest speaker will be introduced at 1.00 pm. The address is of about 30 to 35 minutes duration with 15 minutes for questions, after which coffee or tea is available. We aim to complete the program by 2.00 pm.

CURRENT ISSUES BRIEFING

5.30 pm Keswick Officers' Mess

See newsletter insert for full details

ADDRESS

The Current Issues Briefing by Senator the Honourable Nick Minchin, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, was given on Wednesday 11 June 2008. The topic was "Current Defence Issues".

May I congratulate your Institute on its endeavours to contribute to the national debate about defence and national security. When Brendan Nelson asked me to be Shadow Defence Minister, I jumped at the chance. Since I have been in politics, both as a South Australian Senator and then as a Minister, defence issues have followed me around. Indeed, I have been interested in defence issues since I was a boy - I am the son of a WW2 fighter pilot who served in the Middle East and, who after contracting malaria in that theatre, saw out the war as an Army Captain in Borneo.

My own military experience is somewhat more limited - I had 5 years in the Know Grammar School Cadet Unit, which was then, and still is, one of the country's largest, and I rose to the illustrious rank of Cadet under Officer. As a SA Senator, issues such as the Collins, the future of ASC, the AWD contract, the additional battalion coming to Adelaide, and SA's defence industry cluster are matters I've been very interested in. As Industry Minister and then Finance Minister I was one of the two shareholder Ministers for ASC for nine years, and was actively involved in restructuring the company.

As Finance Minister, I was pleased to have achieved a greater role for the Finance Department in working with Defence on financial issues. The Kinnaird Review of Defence Acquisition was very much a joint Defence/Finance exercise in which I worked closely with Robert Hill to achieve a good outcome. So I come into the defence portfolio with a real interest in military issues, and the opportunity to bring a real continuity of approach on defence matters from the Coalition's years in Government.

The Coalition has always had a very clear and consistent set of principles that we bring to the issue - our military organisation has a vital job to do defending our interests both at home and abroad, and we will give the ADF the personnel, the equipment and the funds it needs to do the job. If I can start with a bit of history, and how the rebuilding of the military over our time in office has been good news for the ADF and great news for South Australia. We came

into office in 1996 at a time when the ADF had been run down under the Hawke and Keating Governments. The 1987 White Paper had effectively endorsed the one-dimensional Defence of Australia policy. Labor's budget was in trouble and two battalions were cut from the Army. John Howard went to the 1996 election with a clear promise to rebuild the military – and the key commitment was to grow the Defence budget by 3% per annum in real terms. In Labor's last eleven Budgets, Defence funding actually fell in real terms, by 2%. In the Coalition's 11 budgets, Defence's funding was increased by 48% - in real terms.

That increased funding has been applied in three main ways – it has gone to recruit and retain more personnel, to better equipment for them, and has funded a number of overseas operations that have very much been in Australia's national interest.

Recruitment and retention

On the personnel front, there will always be issues for militaries around the world in recruiting personnel, especially in a strong labour market. The resources boom is making recruitment and retention particularly difficult, not only for our military, but for many other Australian industries. But in the face of that problem, our recent recruitment and retention packages have really started to work. 2006-07 was the best year for recruiting in a decade – and the second best year in 30 years – with 8,924 recruits signing up. Encouragingly, Defence reported in Senate Estimates last week that this financial year they are on track to do even better. That means we are well on track to recruit the personnel for the extra battalion that will be based in Adelaide from 2010. There are still problems in areas such as submariners and certain trades but specific measures are being targeted at them. We also learnt at Senate Estimates that the Gap Year initiative that the Coalition introduced is working very well – all places were filled in 2008 and the program has been increased in size for 2009.

Equipment

A large part of our additional funding has gone to better equipping our forces.

- The two extra battalions.
- Better protection from tanks to Bushmasters and better personal equipment.

For the Army, we have focused on making them harder, more networked and more mobile – the Abrams tanks acquisition was a significant commitment by our Government.

Much greater mobility through Army's own assets such as helicopters, and through the RAAF and RAN's new equipment – so our troops can get anywhere from a war zone to a natural disaster faster.

As Army chief, General Leahy said in 2005:

Over my 34 years in the Army we have never enjoyed such a high degree of respect and support from the government. Nor have we been accorded such a relatively high priority within the overall scheme of Commonwealth resources as today.

The air power capability we have in the pipeline is very significant.

Next decade, our air fleet will be around 100 JSFs, plus our Super Hornets, equipped with long range missiles, backed by JORN and AWACs, and kept in the air longer with tankers – and all aircraft manned by superbly trained crew.

As a complete air power system, we can claim that we will maintain air superiority in our region for the foreseeable future.

Yes, there has been a great deal of debate about the choices we have made in airpower.

I believe all of these acquisitions will ultimately be supported by the Rudd Government.

The Rudd Government ordered a review of Air Combat Capability – in a not-very-subtle attempt to sully the decisions we made on aircraft acquisitions.

Embarrassingly for them, the first part of the Review has already endorsed our decisions to acquire the Super Hornet and to phase out the F-111.

Mr Fitzgibbon is refusing to release the second part of that Review, but the defence media are pretty sure that it endorses our decision to go with the JSF for the long term.

The fact is that Brendan Nelson acted decisively and with Cabinet support, made the right decisions. When faced with advice about slippage in the JSF program, and with advice on the risks of continuing to fly the F-111, he moved decisively.

He's been criticised for this – but when you compare him to the new Government, where process has been elevated to an end in itself, and actual results are hard to find – I'd prefer Brendan's decisiveness anytime.

This was reinforced to me on my recent visit to the US to visit Boeing and Lockheed-Martin. My top level briefing on the Super Hornet convinced me it's

an extremely capable aircraft and there is no doubt in my mind that the JSF is the right aircraft for Australia.

Another red herring that Mr Fitzgibbon likes to throw into the debate is the Raptor, Lockheed Martin's F-22.

Again, my discussions with Lockheed Martin on my recent US trip convinced me that the Raptor is not what Australia needs. The JSF is a much more appropriate aircraft.

The retiring head of DSTO stated similar views last month – and this was from an interview at the time he retired, so he could allow himself to be forthright:

[Roger Lough] has no doubt that the RAAF's preference for the F-35 joint strike fighter is the right choice for Australia when compared with the more expensive F-22 Raptor.

"The F-22 is a very nice fighter aircraft, but it is not what we want and we have the studies to prove that. DSTO has done the major part of the operational studies for the new air combat capability and that includes an assessment of the F-22. "Many, if not most, of the avionics in the JSF are F-22 derived. So you have learned the lessons of the F-22 and applied them to the JSF. So they are cheaper, more robust, they are more maintainable and they are arguably increasing performance."

It is views like these within the military that convince me that Labor will end up supporting our policy of acquiring the JSF.

The fact that we chose to join the JSF program is already bearing fruit for South Australia – for instance Adelaide defence firm Levett Engineering has multi-million dollar contracts to supply 47 components to the JSF.

Last, but certainly not least, the Navy has been a real beneficiary of our funding – and through them, South Australia.

Early in our term, we got the Collins Class subs back on track and they are now a highly respected diesel-electric platform.

In 2006 work started on planning for the next generation of submarines – subs that won't enter service until 2025 but which need many years of planning to get there.

ASC is the obvious choice to build these subs. Mr Rudd promised during the election that the work would come to Adelaide – and it would dovetail very well with the AWD – but I was concerned during

Senate estimates to discover that Defence officials would not commit to this Rudd election promise – and Senator Faulkner representing the Defence Minister had to be dragged kicking and screaming to confirm the promise.

Our Coalition Government decision to acquire new Air Warfare Destroyers means we will have much bigger and more capable ships than the frigates our Navy has used in recent years.

I don't need to tell you what their construction means to ASC and SA defence industry.

A key decision that the Government is yet to make is about a fourth ship.

The contract we negotiated with the AWD alliance has an option in it for the purchase of a fourth ship at a fixed price.

A decision needs to be made soon on a fourth ship as the option expires later this year, although it was revealed at Senate Estimates that DMO has sought a six month extension.

It would clearly be of real economic benefit to Adelaide; it would give our Navy additional capability – and could allow the withdrawal of older capabilities.

The Government has been silent on a fourth AWD since the election, but on balance it is appropriate for this decision to wait until the White Paper process is completed.

Operations

The third major beneficiary of our increased funding has been operations.

Clearly, there has been a dramatic increase in operational tempo since 1999.

And the Coalition makes no apologies for this.

Part of the clear view that John Howard brought to national security issues in 1996 was a rejection of the narrow Defence of Australia doctrine.

We strongly believe that Australia's national interest is not just protected in our backyard – but it can be advanced further afield, such as in taking on the terrorists in their backyard in Afghanistan.

In other words, one of our guiding principles is that military power is part of our foreign policy. Foreign policy can not be all soft power, and nothing hard.

This has underpinned our development of a balanced force – personnel and equipment that can both defend our neighbourhood, and be deployed in other parts of the world, for combat or humanitarian purposes.

I am optimistic that the current Labor administration have learnt from past mistakes and that their White Paper process will ultimately endorse our balanced force approach.

Bases

If I can add as an aside: one possible concern that you may have with a local issue that will come out of the White Paper process.

As part of the White Paper, Defence is preparing a number of Companion Reviews. One of the reviews is looking at base closures.

And we know from media speculation that bases in the firing line include Keswick and Woodside.

It is not clear whether there will be much consultation with the community on the companion papers.

But I would urge you when the White Paper consultation team comes to Adelaide to get along to those meetings and argue strongly your case for the retention of these bases – which are very important for our SA defence community.

Iraq

If I can talk specifically about the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:

The return home of 600 odd troops reignited some of the debate about the merits of having gone into Iraq.

Mr Rudd has been busy reinventing history in recent weeks, trying to imply that Australia went into the Iraq war knowing that intelligence was faulty, and therefore we went in on a lie.

This accusation ignores all the evidence of the actual intelligence that was before the US, the UK and Australian Governments at the time of the invasion.

And it conveniently ignores that fact that Mr Rudd saw much of the same evidence at the time, and agreed that there were WMD's.

In 2002 Mr Rudd went to London to be briefed by senior British politicians on Iraq. Upon his return to Australia, he said this:

There is no debate or dispute as to whether Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass

destruction. He does. There's no dispute as to whether he's in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. He is.

In October 2002, he said in a speech:

...Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. That is a matter of empirical fact. If you don't believe he intelligence assessments, you simply read the most recent bulletin from the Federation of American Scientists, which lists Iraq among a number of States in possession of chemical, biological weapons and with the capacity to develop a nuclear program...

All the governments that went to war in Iraq did so in good faith trusting the intelligence they were provided by their analysts and their allies – as did Mr Rudd.

The fact that this intelligence proved to be inaccurate does not mean that the decision to join the war was based on a lie.

After initially a very successful campaign – including key roles played by our special forces, the US did err in how they managed the immediate post-Saddam period. I think it is generally agreed that disbanding the military and de-Baathification were big mistakes.

But look at the plus side.

I think we all rejoiced when we saw the pictures of Saddam's statue being pulled down and a feeling of satisfaction when he was finally captured.

When you have newspapers such as the *Washington Post* editorialising about the success of the surge, and how the Maliki Government and the Iraqi armed forces are now standing up and taking direct responsibility.

There will always be a debate about whether the costs outweighed the benefits but if the ultimate result is the Iraqi people living free of fear and Iraq being an example of democracy for the rest of the Middle East, then I believe it will have been worth it.

In the meantime, Australia will continue to make a contribution to security in Iraq for some time to come. In April I visited the HMAS Arunta – then our frigate guarding Iraqi oil platforms – and flew with our Orions on patrol in the Gulf. Those personnel were certainly proud of the contribution they were making.

As I am sure our security detachment, headquarters and logistics staff are.

The CDF has said that our Overwatch task in southern Iraq is complete and those troops can come home – and we accept that.

But we do believe that we should continue to provide military training within Iraq.

When announcing the withdrawal of combat troops, the Government was quick to talk up all the benefits that our training had provided Iraq – 33,000 personnel trained, including 250 Iraqi trainers themselves trained.

We learnt that the Government had offered to continue military training outside Iraq – an offer that Iraq had declined.

If our training is of such value, and if there is no in-principle objection to training Iraqis outside Iraq, why not continue to train them in Iraq.

But the argument about training is just one part of the debate.

In general terms, we now have relative bipartisanship regarding Australia's future in Iraq – we will keep a force of around 1,000 for some time to come – so talk of Australia having withdrawn from Iraq is certainly premature.

Afghanistan

As compared to Iraq, there is a high degree of bipartisanship on Afghanistan and this is welcome.

We both agree that preventing al Qaeda re-establishing itself in Afghanistan is a good idea; that defeating the Taliban is a good idea; that standing with our NATO allies is a good idea; and cutting opium production is a good idea.

Let's not forget that three of the Bali bombers trained in Afghanistan.

On the ground, there is better news out of Afghanistan.

The vast bulk of the country in the north and west is relatively peaceful.

The British commander in Afghanistan has talked positively about the tide flowing against the Taliban – with a large number of their personnel and particularly key commanders, killed in recent months.

The CDF gave a blunt assessment to Senate Estimates last week that we are doing well on the ground tactically – but cautioned that the allies need to do more on the strategic front. He said:

Our tactical level operations in Uruzgan are going wonderfully well. We really have the Taliban on the back foot. The British, in their province, have had some good tactical success, and I think that is reflected in different ways across the southern part of Afghanistan. But winning tactically is one thing; it is winning the strategic battle that is really important. The strategic battle requires a comprehensive approach.

The Afghani Government now also reports that 20 of the 28 provinces are drug free.

This is all good news.

Many of the lessons belatedly learnt in Iraq are being applied well in Afghanistan – working on the ground with local people and local leaders to build capacity, to offer them a better future than the Taliban can – while taking the fight up to insurgents.

From all reports, Australian troops have a certain empathy with the locals that makes us ideal for the reconstruction work in Uruzgun. At the same time, our troops are ranging further to take on the Taliban.

Tough decisions will come in the next two years depending on what decision the Dutch make about their force that our reconstruction team works with in Uruzgun Province – what do we do if the Dutch phase down or completely withdraw their force.

The CDF has indicated that contingency planning will commence on this question this year.

This will be a difficult decision for Australia - and especially difficult for Labor as an election may be in the offing.

But I can offer the Coalition's full support for a decision made at the time on the best of operational and strategic advice from the ADF, and in consultation with NATO.

Closing

It is important to demonstrate to the community that we have a continuity of approach on important matters like national security.

That the Coalition parties will bring a consistent set of values to the big national security questions.

I think we demonstrated this consistency of approach in our 11 years in office.

And if I can point to some third party endorsements of our approach on Defence and on foreign policy more generally.

First a quote from a recent report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute:

Notwithstanding the series of deployments that have kept the defence force busy in recent years, in terms of the big picture Australia is sitting pretty; the Asia-Pacific has not experienced major interstate conflict for more than three decades, our alliance with the United States is arguably as strong as at any time since WWII, our relations with Japan and China are more cooperative than at anytime in history, and many obstacles have been overcome to see our relationship with Indonesia improved. Compared with the turmoil of the twentieth century, these are good times indeed.

And lastly a quote from a paper in Quadrant from Michael Evans, a Fellow at the Australian Defence College. He wrote:

[Howard's] achievements in simultaneously deepening the US Alliance, forging security relationships with Indonesia and Japan and developing new intimacy with China surpass anything achieved in security affairs by his predecessors from Holt to Keating.

We achieved a great deal in Government. Our job now in Opposition is to offer bipartisanship where it is appropriate and in the national interest, but also to carefully scrutinise the Rudd Government's management of Defence and National Security, and expose their shortcomings whenever and wherever they occur.

Thanks again for the opportunity to speak to you tonight.

[END]

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

The luncheon address on Monday 2 June 2008 on the topic of "**Reconstruction and Multi-Agency Operations - Securing a Long Term Benefit for Failed and Failing States.**" was given by Colonel Neil Greet, Department of Defence, Canberra on

behalf of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, AO, DSC, CSM.

I would like to start by stating that I am representing the Vice Chief of Defence Force, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie today on this topic. I pass on his apologies that he could not make it. This presentation I will give today is his words from the Reconstruction During Conflict Seminar in September of last year. Essentially, I was and remain his project officer on this topic, hence the reason he asked me to stand in his place today. When I get to the end I will close with some personal observations but will make it clear that we have moved from the VCDF's words to my thoughts.

The subject I will discuss in my address today is the facilitation of reconstruction in unstable and hostile environments, and why that task has always been much more complex than just a mixture of contractors from industry and military engineers. It will not be lost on any of you that this is a complexity that Australia, and in particular the Australian Defence Force, is facing right now in several regions of the world. It is therefore a subject which demands our attention. This is one of the issues behind the government's establishment of the Asia Pacific – CIMIC Centre and the recent public comments on Afghanistan by the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister.

Not Just About Engineering

[Slide 4]

At the outset, and mindful of my background, and the VCDF's I want to be clear that I am not simply talking about engineering for its own sake. Rather, I want to explore what future contribution the broad spectrum of engineering sciences and skills can make to nations suffering in unstable or hostile environments, how to enhance their reconstruction efforts and how we can more rapidly bring about a cessation of hostilities.

The rehabilitation of nations at war involves many activities. Activities like security, governance, law and order, finance, education and politics. These issues form the natural melting pot of society. In Defence, our own consideration of these needs led to the Chief of Defence Force adopting a doctrinal policy, in December 2006, called '*Adaptive Campaigning*'. Adaptive campaigning addresses these competing needs in a typically structured, military manner.

[Slide 5]

Today I will explore what activities, in an engineering sense, are essential elements of early national

reconstruction. Too many commentators, planners, institutions and governments gloss over this extremely important element and the result can often be a non-unified application of national and international power. They expect that it will simply happen as it does in our normal 'day to day' life. This mistake can, and does, threaten mission success and it perhaps unnecessarily prolongs the conflict and/or the reconstruction effort.

[Slide 6]

Sewage, water, electricity, and solid waste removal all exist below the noise level of normal city life in modern Western society. In reality, there is a vast city planning effort that keeps services operational. A State in conflict will normally have poorly maintained and poorly managed systems and services. For example, sewage lines will probably be blocked, backing up and tainting the water supply. That same sewage probably has no place to go, as sewage pumps in lift stations are not working because the electrical grid is not functioning. Large swaths of cities and towns will then be left with raw sewage running freely through the streets. Piles of garbage will grow and further pollute the area. You get the general picture.

[Slide 7]

The re-establishment of security, law and order, health and morale will all be adversely affected if these engineering problems remain unaddressed. Reconstruction is therefore a very key element of the overall plan and must be approached concurrently with other facets of security and Nation building. In Defence, we've applied our lessons learned architecture to understand that reconstruction requires not only a 'Whole-of-Army' or 'Whole-of-Defence' approach – involving warfighting, engineering, logistics, adaptive training, and many other elements, as established in our *Adaptive Campaigning Doctrine* – but we also understand that a 'Whole-of-Government' and 'Whole-of-Nation' approach must be adopted if success is to be achieved in the shortest possible time and at the least cost.

[Slide 8]

Since 2004 the ADF has, of course, done tremendous things on the ground in many parts of the world. Sumatra Assist and the Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan are two case studies that come immediately to mind. They were and are extraordinary efforts on the ground and Australia should be rightfully proud of the efforts of our people.

However, I sometimes think that we are perhaps too busy doing reconstruction, and that we are not taking the time necessary to raise our lessons in academic

and professional fora, in such a way as to influence debate and ensure a better outcome for the future. We need to ensure that the term 'Whole-of-Nation' is not just a cliché, but that it evolves to become descriptor for a cost effective way of harnessing all the elements of national and international power to ensure a better, more effective way of looking at reconstruction into the future.

We need to set the agenda for a way ahead, because there is no separate organisation in Australia doing this for us. We do not have an organisation like the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit established under the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom. Perhaps we should?

[Slide 9]

This slide depicts the different National approaches around the World.

Now at this very early point, let me make it clear that this is not about Defence setting the National agenda. Neither is it about Defence telling Industry, other Government Agencies nor NGOs what we think they should do. Rather, Defence recognises that it is critical for these stakeholders to 'buy in' to the concept. Only through a coordinated, effective and efficient approach can the synergy of our respective strengths be realised to achieve rapid results for nations in conflict and people in need.

[Slide 10]

Environment

We have all seen the various ways conflicts can manifest, and how Australia might be required to respond.

The current geopolitical environment is characterised by changes such as the rise of radical Islam witnessed in New York, Washington DC, London, Madrid, Egypt and Bali; the increasing threat of WMD proliferation; and of course the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that are reshaping global and regional relationships. In addition, the risk of inter-state conflict, while perhaps reduced in likelihood, still remains a threat.

[Slide 11]

The phenomenon of failed or fragile states is not merely a Middle East phenomenon. The Southwest Pacific will continue to struggle with the challenges of state fragility, climate change and exploitation by outside actors. ADF deployments will likely take on an increasingly diverse set of roles and Australia's military personnel will need to be just as diverse — from war fighters, peacekeepers, humanitarian

assistance providers, disaster relief responders, counter insurgency operators, border protectors and probably other things we haven't yet considered. Many of these roles will feature in deployments to our immediate north and northeast.

[Slide 12]

Another layer to our operating environment is our organisational template. The cry of the 20th century, with the mass production of maps, was that battles always occurred on the juncture of four maps. This required the poor staff officer to cut and paste four maps together, in the field, and it always seemed to those who had to do this that it always occurred on a cold wet night with the enemy in full attack.

Then, as now, the enemy always seems to be innately clever and able to exploit our disadvantage, or not allow us to exploit our own advantage. I put it to you that during the stabilisation operations in which we are involved right now in the Middle East, the insurgents have exploited an area of organisational weakness that conventional Western forces and our streamlined organisations of government were, and perhaps still are, not yet optimally prepared.

[Slide 13]

From an organisational perspective, modern Western forces have successfully created the most effective set of systems for rapid execution of combat operations ever seen. We can achieve immediate effects through rapid deployment and very effective command and control of our military assets. What we have not been able to do is create similar systems for the deployment and utilisation of the other elements of our national or international power. And we cannot, and will not, ever be able to duplicate those capabilities in our military organisations.

We continue to see military strategies devised and enacted, but we rarely ever see unified national or grand strategies which apply elements of non-military power in a unified fashion. Our own Nation's regulations, and bureaucratic processes, staff relationships and culture all complicate the environment for our soldiers and leaders. This lack of unity of purpose is even more pronounced when we consider that we rarely do reconstruction outside a coalition environment.

[Slide 14]

Whether or not you believe our enemies planned to fight in this space, we find ourselves fighting an enemy in a geopolitical environment where our modern management practices and organisational thinking has created a unity of purpose vacuum. We are often on different map pages and we need to do

something to make a more robust 'Whole-of-Nation' approach – before that battle on a rainy night.

Reconstruction during Conflict

[Slide 15]

The title my oration—' *Reconstruction and Multi-Agency Operations - Securing a Long Term Benefit for Failed and Failing States* '—was a considered choice. Reconstruction in a post conflict, stabilised situation is a much more simply solved problem. However, it is no longer sufficient to think of military operations during conflict as dissociated, sequential events. Executing traditionally focused combat operations, while concentrating on the training of local security forces does work, but only in the short term.

Without concurrent reconstruction of all of the key elements of society, true long term progress can become stalled. This delay in progress creates unintended and usually undesirable second and third order effects which can promote the growth of insurgent forces working effectively against our campaign objectives. Military operations and security force training alone is a lopsided approach.

[Slide 16]

Military professionals now understand that it is no longer acceptable to think sequentially through military and support operations. Security and reconstruction operations must be concurrent, and complementary, if success is to be guaranteed and the conflict curtailed in the shortest possible time.

The 'Whole-of-Nation' rhetoric flows easily off the tongue. Indeed its logic is sensible and easily understood. However, we also understand that achieving integration across many agencies, each with different workplace cultures and competing views of priorities and even on which is the best way ahead, is never going to be easy. We, the ADF and other key stakeholders, must recognise any institutional obstacles in order to negotiate them, successfully and together. Only then can we claim to have learned the lessons of our past engagements, realise where our synergies exist, and posture ourselves for the future success.

Getting 'Whole-of-Nation' Buy In

[Slide 17]

So, let us look at the term 'Whole-of-Nation' in recognisable building blocks. Let me start with Inter agency actions. As the then Head of Strategic Operations Division, the VCDF led the ADF strategic

planning for the 2003 intervention in the Solomon Islands.

There was enormous good will and a strong desire from all Agencies, including NGOs, to plan quickly and co-operatively. There was a clear understanding of the National imperative and we planned in a healthy environment that set the platform for an extraordinarily successful Australian Federal Police led operation. That 'Whole-of-Government' approach, with Defence acting in a supporting role to the Australian Federal Police and the rest of RAMSI continues to be successful today.

[Slide 18]

The VCDF notes that there are extraordinarily good personal relationships at the Secretary and Deputy Secretary level throughout government agencies. So, why is 'Whole-of-Government' not an easy concept to enact? Well the reality is that not all agencies see themselves as having an external responsibility. More importantly, they are neither structured nor funded for external activities of the type required in the reconstruction problem set we have established for this address. It is this organisational reality, the agencies focus, and the cultures which stem from it, that makes the simple view of inter-agency work leading to a 'Whole-of-Government' approach more difficult to achieve.

Now, this problem is compounded when we add NGO and industry equations to the 'Whole-of-Government' paradigm to try to create 'Whole-of-Nation'. Both NGO and industry are needed to create the required 'Whole-of-Nation' approach that we all agree is essential for success. The question for us is how do we enable this situation?

[Slide 19]

The ADF is not without its own shortcomings and we are not as well advanced in the use of contractors from industry in the operational environment as some other Western Nations. We still need to overcome mindsets which cause us to falsely use operational security as hurdle to reaching out to industry, professional bodies, or academia in order to best utilise the collective national engineer intellect available to us.

[Slide 20]

But what of contractor-based support to concurrently reconstruct nations during conflict? I believe there are many lessons worth consideration that stem from the structural and cultural reforms in Defence led by Dr Steve Gumley of the DMO. The first notion I would like to offer quickly here for your consideration is that 'profit is good'.

This is a notion that traditional government bureaucracies struggle to understand. Contracts should allow for Australian business to make good profit. But there is also 'bad profit' which unduly swells the bottom line and fundamentally works against the goal of developing economic pluralism in the nation where the conflict occurs – and even in the Nation from which the reconstruction effort is being mounted. Cheque book contracting without good project governance and oversight is doomed to creating mistrust in the very people you are attempting to take from the shadows of conflict.

The second notion is about risk and the type of contract that needs to be developed for the risk you wish to carry. The notion of cheap contract and carriage of risk by the contractor is simply bad business. The right contract and the right level of partnership are critical to success. This is something which needs to be addressed now, and it is not something which can be debated at crunch time.

The third notion is that of the smart buyer. Inter-agency staffs who manage contractors must have a well developed understanding of what is being bought. The smart buyer concept demands a high level of professional knowledge and project management skills within government. If we are not committed to that goal our wider endeavours are doomed to failure.

The issue of business supporting both Australia's national interest as well as the interests of the nation at conflict is an interesting line of debate. I know that some Australian companies have made a decision to not offer their services in this field because the risk is not acceptable.

I also wonder right now about our true industrial capacity in Australia to support reconstruction efforts during conflict. I think we all acknowledge that we currently suffer a skills shortage that threatens our current economic boom. It is possible that our economy could contract and then naturally, with some pain, industry would also contract. So, if we want an **adaptive reconstruction capability** that is not just 'Whole-of-Government' but '*Whole-of-Nation*', we need to think long and hard about where that capability will be located and how it can be marshalled. I'm sure that it won't simply be sitting on the shelf just waiting for us to say 'now'.

I guess a South Australian defence audience is well in tune with these thoughts from DMO and they are not new. But I will vouch for the fact that these issues are not at the forefront of those that commentate on the stabilisation issue. And they should be!

[Slide 21]

We need to set about developing a comprehensive understanding of where our capability and capacity gaps lie. There is truly a great deal of work to be done in this area and I suggest that we will have to audit Government and Australian industry so that we can match critical gaps with known providers.

NGO's

The other critical 'Whole-of-Nation' players that I have touched on are the NGOs.

[Slide 22]

The issue of ethical understanding may drive the NGOs in their method of operation. However cost and security are also key issues for NGOs. The cost and security of the tasks that NGOs can undertake, as well as the determination of what activities will achieve the greatest effect must be considered.

Government agencies should not look at NGO effects from a control perspective, but rather from a perspective of identifying and leveraging common ground. This won't necessarily be easy as some NGOs have a viewpoint that if government is doing it then non-government organisations must do something different. Shared knowledge and shared outcomes are difficult in this environment.

What does the ADF Provide?

[Slide 23]

So what does the ADF provide to the 'Whole-of-Nation' approach? Simply put, a trusted and professional ADF provides a more secure environment for Contractors and NGOs to carry out their work. But providing security is not where military capability ends.

Many commentators question why a military force is concerned with infrastructure repair, governance, and economic pluralism: why not rely on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AUSAID, and NGOs? It comes down to a simple answer of capacity relative to the situation.

The ADF has the means to rapidly move all agencies, not just the military, to a conflict using its inventory of ships, aircraft and vehicles. The ADF can provide a responsive and protected means of support in a conflict area. It also offers the ability to coordinate activities through very good command, control and communications systems.

[Slide 24]

The ADF offers medical care until hospitals are established, and it offers immediate engineering services. The ADF can utilise our reserve forces to boost capacity and to address large scale essential service issues. The ADF provides capacity early and until a transition to industry led solutions can be affected.

A critical ADF capability that government has utilised on many occasions in recent times is its inherent and robust planning capability. This type of planning capability exists in very few places elsewhere in government or private enterprise. Defence is capable of rapidly providing significant numbers of experienced personnel to produce detailed estimates for operational requirements.

[Slide 25]

Additionally, the ADF workforce has demonstrated a marked ability to adapt culturally to very difficult situations. The best example of this is the response to the Tsunami that devastated many Asian nations on 26 Dec 2004. And you have seen a number of photos from EX Sumatra Assist in the slide show.

There are many examples in the past where reconstruction has occurred in fragile states within our region, and can I also emphasise the history of the support that the ADF provided to indigenous communities in the most remote parts of Australia. These domestic reconstruction activities including infrastructure, health, and training, without doubt helped shape and train the ADF for such reconstruction tasks as we see today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[Slide 26]

There is a need to adapt our force structure in the face of the evolving geopolitical circumstance. We have not done much in that regard to date, and it stands as a continuing challenge to those in Defence today. There is much more to be done to properly consider force structure effects and the ADF's ability to provide an adaptive, continually effective, reconstruction capability in a complex environment. This will be a key part of the reviews underway in the development of the new White Paper.

[Slide 27]

Conclusion

Defence has a critical role to play in meeting the demands of stabilisation, and reconstruction during conflict. But the ADF cannot, and should not, be seen as a sole source organisation. Indeed the ADF provides niche capabilities in what must be a wider

'Whole-of-Nation' effort. The great work we've done in undertaking activities such as the Reconstruction Task force in Afghanistan is encouraging. However, Afghanistan will only be a success when the full scale effects of National and International elements of power are applied under 'Whole-of-Nation' strategies. It will not be easy work. But if it's done well, effective, immediate and responsive reconstruction will have a much more profound effect in shaping the future than any decisive act of conventional war. It is not surprising therefore to see the Defence Minister and Prime Minister active in this space at the present time.

That is what the VCDF has to say on the topic.

Comments by Colonel Greet

[slide 28]

I am just going to add a few insights from my work with the VCDF. The first is his strong desire to express this work as a grand unifying strategy. The world is full of strategies, but in the defence arena, most remain rooted in a geo-political construct revolving around the threats and machinations of major powers. I guess some of you particularly those that build submarines would argue that you need to be able to have a defence force that can 'rip an arm off a major power' as said by Ross Babbage. This idea of strategy is different.

Secondly, I am amazed at the response to this concept across a number of different working cultures. It is not necessarily about warfighting and it is not necessarily about philanthropic humanitarian work. My sense is that as Australians become more affluent they are seeking ways of playing a greater role in the world. I could talk at length about my thoughts on why it is a happening, but I will just say something is happening that seems to be attracting people across the professions to this arena to be involved in the rehabilitation of failed states.

Finally, a multi-agency approach threatens to change the way government agencies work with each other. While everyone agrees with the logic, each Department wants their own railway gauge. It will be challenging once we move beyond talking.

[Slide 29]

Thank you for your time today and I am happy to accept any questions you might have.

MEDALS – MEMENTOS & MORE

SPECIALISING IN
Medal Mounting & Refurbishment,
Replacement of Medals
Replicas & Miniatures Service Research
and Heritage Framing

Ken Cocks
Senior Sgt SAPol (Retd)
CMF/ARES (Retd)
Phone/Fax: (08) 8278 8530
Mobile 0411 415 817
Email: medals@ozemail.com.au

46 Coromandel Pde,
BLACKWOOD SA 5051

NOTE TO THE NEWSLETTER

At the meeting on 02 June 2008 an article in The Weekend Australian May 31-June 1 2008 on p14 entitled " IAEA 'alarm" at Iran nuke document" was paraphrased and labelled a spoof.

Some RUSI members requested a note to our news letter to explain the matter further.

The article, purportedly from a correspondent in Vienna, reported that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief for inspections Olli Heinonen had a 15-page document which " describes the process of shaping uranium metal into two hemispheres of the kind used in nuclear warheads" and gave this as alarming, with no reason to possess such a document "unless they wanted to produce uranium hemispheres for a nuclear weapon," a diplomat present at the briefing was reported as relaying to the correspondent.

Of course the Iranians were on record as denying such intent and the article went further, giving cause for concern that IAEA thought that Iran "may have looked into high explosives of the sort used in implosion-type nuclear bombs ".

Now most who have studied the field are aware that moving two hemispheres of uranium metal close to each other was known as twisting the dragons tail as there is a noticeable rise in temperature as such an assembly goes to criticality, but they have to be

separated before there is so much radioactive emission as to endanger the life of the experimenter. Such an assembly however can only do local (in laboratory) damage, perhaps killing those playing the game by excess radiation, before coming apart. It is not a bomb assembly.

The confusion arises because an implosion bomb, such as the Nagasaki weapon used in 1945, has a spherical core geometry. That type of core is of the 239 isotope of plutonium not of uranium and is detonated by using more-or-less conventional explosives to crush a hollow sphere of Pu in on itself to go prompt critical - bang! Two hemispheres of uranium are not used for this purpose.

Uranium bomb assemblies, while easier to construct, such as that used on Hiroshima in 1945, are designed on the shot gun principle, ramming two pieces of uranium 235 together, not by implosion. As production of highly enriched uranium is a tedious, expensive process, unless one has a huge facility in operation, such as the now-closed Oak Ridge plant in USA ,already at one's beck and call, it is cheaper and more efficient to go the plutonium track, even though the actual bomb design and construction are much more difficult than by going on the uranium track.

Hoping that this helps. A lay man's guide to some of this is available in the RUSI library without any of the higher maths nor reactor and bomb parts of nuclear physics, but plenty of the politics and soul searching beloved of those making decisions with none of the detailed specific knowledge necessary to really understand the matter:-

The Bomb a Life by Gerard J DeGroot Jonathon Cape London Our call number: 940.55 DeG

Colin C Brooks

LIBRARY

As you know, we have an extensive library, with books dating back to the early 19th Century on military expeditions and various subjects and more books are being added all the time. Members are always welcome to avail themselves of the library's facilities.

Come in during normal library hours (10 am to 4 pm Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays) to peruse the extensive range of books, magazines and Service newspapers that are on display, and relax with a cup of tea or coffee.