



**Royal United Services
Institute
of
South Australia Inc**

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NEWSLETTER

Promoting National Security and Defence

RUSI-SA CYBERLINKS

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JUNE LUNCHEON
Senator Alan Ferguson

JULY LUNCHEON
**His Excellency Major General (Rtd) Jioji
Konousi Konrote**

WINTER CARVERY
Flagstaff Hill Golf Club

MEMBERSHIP DRIVE
FREE WINE OFFER
details included with this Newsletter

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Following an incident involving the media at our Monthly Luncheon in April, I wish to remind members that only the Council of RUSI-SA is authorised to invite media representatives to attend our activities. Our Monthly Luncheon meetings, and any other of our activities that includes guest speakers, may be held either 'on the record' or under the Chatham House Rule. In the latter case, it may be agreed with the speaker(s) that it would be conducive to free discussion that their presentation, or part thereof, should be strictly private and thus held under the Chatham House Rule.

The Chatham House Rule reads as follows:

"When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed."

The Chatham House Rule originated at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in Chatham House, London, in 1927. It was further refined in 1992. Its aim is to guarantee the anonymity of speakers and to act as an aid to free discussion. The Rule allows people to speak as individuals, and to express views that may not be those of their organisations and, therefore, it encourages free discussion. Speakers usually feel more relaxed if they don't have to worry about their reputation or the implications if they are publicly quoted.

The Chatham House Rule is widely used in the English-speaking world, and members will be informed, from time to time, when the Rule applies to particular speakers. The Object of the RUSI, *inter alia*, is to encourage vigorous debate on issues of national security and defence, and the Chatham House Rule serves to establish a climate that facilitates such debate. I ask members to be aware

of, and respect, the conditions associated with invitations to the media and the application of the Chatham House Rule to our activities. I would also be grateful if members would ensure that their invited guests are informed of these conditions applying to their attendance.

Colonel Neville Bergin (Rtd)
President

MONTHLY LUNCHEONS

CAR PARKING – MONTHLY LUNCHEON

Members are advised that the parking of cars is now NO longer permitted on the Parade Ground. Please use existing designated parking areas.

All members are invited to attend our luncheons. Indeed you are encouraged to invite partners, friends and colleagues to join us and, if they like what they see, to nominate them for membership. Please book in advance. If you are unsure whether or not your name is on the booking list, please check!

Cancellations must be into the RUSI Office by midday of the Friday before the lunch. Subsequent cancellations will attract a fee of \$15.00.

The dress code for the luncheon is neat casual, taking into consideration weather conditions.

We assemble in Building 34A, Keswick Barracks, Keswick, at approximately 11.30am for drinks and good fellowship. Members are asked to be seated by 12 noon when our President welcomes members and guests, and lunch is served.

The cost of the buffet is \$15.00. We also conduct a raffle to help cover expenses. Our Caterer has agreed to provide vegetarian meals and sweets for diabetics, but these must be ordered before midday on the Thursday before the lunch.

For those who do not have time to enjoy lunch, but wish to hear the lecture, chairs are provided around the perimeter of the hall. Please be seated before 12.55pm, as the guest speaker will be introduced at 1.00pm. The address is of about 30 to 35 minutes duration with 15 minutes for questions, after which coffee or tea is available.

We aim to complete the program by 2.00pm.

The Program is:

Monthly Luncheon Monday, 7th June 2004.

Speaker: Senator Alan Ferguson
Chairman, Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade

Topic: Australia's Role in Global Security

Senator Ferguson will give an overview of Australian Defence Force commitments in areas of deployment throughout the world.

Monthly Luncheon Monday 5th July 2004.

Speaker: His Excellency Major General (Rtd)
Jioji Konousi Konrote,
High Commissioner for the Republic of
the Fiji Islands
(We are awaiting confirmation)



RUSI-SA

WINTER CARVERY

Date: Sunday, 18th July 2004

Time: 12.00pm for 12.30pm

Location: Flagstaff Hill Golf Club
Memford Way
Flagstaff Hill, SA, 5159

Winter Carvery Consists of:
Soup – Pea and Ham.

Main Course – Roast Beef, Lamb and
Turkey, Roast Vegetables and
Greens, Gravy and Condiments.

Dessert – Pavlova with Seasonal
Fruits
or Warm Apple Danish

Tea, Coffee and Mints

Wine and Beer available for
individual purchase.

Cost - \$25 per head

Gourmet Raffle

Tables of 10 can be booked for
groups, or individuals
can be accommodated

All bookings and payments must be
to Mrs Pam Jones, Secretary RUSI-A
by Friday 16th July 2004.

MEMBERSHIP

The following have been nominated for membership:

Mrs Lesley F.D. Shalless
(LCDR R.C. Penglase, DSC, RFD, VRD, RANR, AUA Rtd)

Mrs Judith V. Steele
(LT H.E. Shipp)

LCDR Peter A. Tunbridge
(Mr J.B.W. Rischbieth)

We regret to announce the deaths of:

Mr David A. Burrows
CMDR Phillip R. Hudson



Views expressed in this Newsletter are not necessarily those of the RUSI-SA Inc

LUNCHEON ADDRESS 5th April 2004

**Dr Mark Thomson
Australian Strategic Policy Institute**

I'd like to tell you about two recent studies we've undertaken at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute; *Pay Your Money and Take Your Pick* and *A Trillion Dollars and Counting*.

PAY YOUR MONEY AND TAKE YOUR PICK

This year the Government appropriated \$15.4 billion to Defence which amounts to 1.9% of GDP. Should we be spending more or less than this? The only way

to know is to see what impact more or less spending would have on the capabilities of the ADF and the military tasks they can undertake. After all, it's what you get for the money that matters, not how much you spend. To this end we have examined five different options for future defence spending. Two higher spending, two lower spending, and a fifth for the Government's current plans.

These options looked at what could be developed if we began smoothly and realistically increasing or cutting defence spending tomorrow. As a practicality, the options are constructed by adding and subtracting from the capabilities of the current force and the Government's recently updated Defence Capability Plan (DCP) for future capabilities. Because it takes a long time to develop new military capabilities we chose the year 2010-11 to compare costs (expressed in 2003-04 dollars).

We have drawn no conclusion on which option is right for Australia. Our aim is to inform the defence spending debate by linking ends and means.

Where are we now?

Australia probably remains today the most capable air and naval power in Southeast Asia. Our fleets of F-18 fighter and F-111 strike aircraft are significant even in comparison with the major powers of the Asia-Pacific. Our Army is very high quality but very small and ill-equipped for substantial land force operations against capable adversaries.

Five Options for the Future

Option One – Back to the 90's (Budget in 2010-11: \$13.5b, 1.2% GDP)

If we returned Defence spending to 1990's levels major chunks of capability would be lost. Option One accommodates such a cut by retiring the F-111, foregoing the purchase of the Joint Strike Fighter by retaining the F-18 until 2020, retiring the Navy's older FFG frigates and cancelling the planned 3 Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). Army would be cut by around 3000 troops to pre 1999 levels.

This would have three consequences. First, it would scale down our ability to contribute substantial forces to global coalitions in either conventional conflicts or peace operations. Second, it would limit our ability to play a leading role in our immediate neighbourhood, especially our ability to handle multiple crises, or to sustain long-term deployments. Third, over the long term it would erode our air defence capability, as regional countries overtook our increasingly outdated air combat and naval forces. Over time we would have to rely more on the US for our own direct defence, and for the defence of our interests in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Nonetheless, we could still exercise a reasonable level of control of our maritime approaches, at least so far as our closer neighbours

were concerned, and at least for the next several years.

Option Two – Refocused Priorities (Budget in 2010-11: \$13.5b, 1.2% GDP)

Option Two re-balances the ADF by making all the cuts to Navy and Airforce from Option 1 and by adding 3 battalions to Army along with a land-based Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) capability.

This would have all the limitations of Option One in terms of air and maritime capabilities. But with a larger Army we would be better placed to make a significant ground force contribution to coalition operations. In fact, with the recent announcement to acquire new tanks we could contribute to high intensity operations like Iraq once other already planned land force enhancements are complete. Yet in absolute terms our Army would still be small by regional standards.

This kind of posture might make sense in a world in which the US is strongly committed to its allies like Australia. Perhaps we could rely more on America's command of the air and sea for the defence of our own territory and the stability of our immediate neighbourhood, and to balance that greater dependence by an increased capacity to contribute land forces to US-led coalitions. It should not be assumed that such a deal could be struck.

Option 3 – Current Plans (Budget in 2010-11: \$13.5b, 1.7% GDP)

The DCP sets out a program to upgrade and replace much of the ADF over the next 15 years. This includes replacing the F-18 with the F-35 JSF and acquiring 3 Air Warfare Destroyers. In its most recent announcement the Government added replacement tanks and larger replacement amphibious vessels to its plans.

These initiatives will ensure that Australia remains a substantial maritime power in the Asia-Pacific, with a high level of confidence that it can defend its own maritime approaches, and respond effectively to any intrusion of hostile forces into our nearer region. We would have the capacity to offer substantial air, special or naval forces to global or regional coalitions in higher-level conflicts, even against quite capable adversaries. We would also have the capacity to undertake and lead modest land operations in our immediate neighbourhood, and to contribute to global or regional peace operations further afield. Nonetheless our land force capabilities would remain limited by their size to relatively small-scale operations.

Option 4 –Stepping Up (Budget in 2010-11: \$13.5b, 2.1% GDP)

Option 4 builds on Current Plans by accelerating and doubling the size of the planned AWD project while increasing the planned purchases of Air-to-Air

Refuelling (AAR) and Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) from 4 to 6 aircraft each. In addition, the boost to Army outlined in Option 2 would be made.

This would constitute a substantial expansion of Australia's military capabilities both for independent operations close to home and for global and regional coalition operations. It would enhance our standing as a regional power and as a US ally, and enhance our ability to defend our continent. But it would not amount to a qualitative change to our strategic posture. We would be able to operate independently in our own near neighbourhood against any credible conventional adversary, and make a modest but valuable contribution to coalitions in the wider region or beyond. But our ability to influence events on the ground, even in our immediate neighbourhood, would remain very limited due to the relative size of our forces, and our ability to project power beyond our own neighbourhood would likewise remain limited.

Option 5 – Thinking Big (Budget in 2010-11: \$13.5b, 2.5% GDP)

This option boosts the ADF across the board including an additional mechanised brigade, 6 strategic transport aircraft, extra Army helicopters and – wait for it – two modest sized aircraft carriers plus aircraft.

Option Five offers Australia a qualitatively different range of strategic choices from those provided by our current plans or by the enhancements envisaged under Option Four. This option moves the focus of our force planning away from a capacity to dominate our extended maritime approaches towards a substantial capability for power projection beyond those approaches. It moves the focus away from the ability to undertake relatively low-level land operations in our immediate neighbourhood towards a capacity for sustained higher-level amphibious operations. And it moves the focus away from niche capabilities to global coalitions towards the ability to make substantive contributions to major land campaigns against capable adversaries.

Under Option Five, therefore, Australia's standing as a regional power and as a US ally would be significantly enhanced.

A TRILLION DOLLARS AND COUNTING

Back in 1950 we spent around \$3 billion a year on defence in today's dollars, compared with around \$15.7 this year. This has nothing to do with any increase in the size of the force. In fact, the opposite has occurred. The strength of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has shrunk to less than 54,000, and long gone are the two aircraft carriers we operated in the 1950s. There's no escaping the fact that the cost of our military force has increased substantially. So what does the future hold? Will we be able to afford

our current range and scale of military forces through to 2050 as the cost of Australia's ageing population mounts? And will there be enough young people to maintain the size of force anyway? These are central issues for long-term strategic planning given the 30 to 40 year gaps between the conception and final disposal of many items of military equipment. Future generations will have to live with, and pay for, the decisions we make today.

Current projections of the Australian population indicate that the number of young people of recruitment age will remain more or less static out to 2050. This is because the greying of the population is driven by a growing number of older people rather than a falling number of younger ones. Even in the more pessimistic projections, there will continue to be more than 2 million people of recruitment age from which only around 6,000 people need to be found each year.

However, this is not the full picture. If current trends in full-time workforce participation by young males continue, it will get more difficult to maintain the ADF *with current recruitment rates*. But this is ultimately a recruitment and retention problem, not a demographic one. Provided the ADF is agile and responsive it should be able to get and keep the people it needs. One of the first things to do is to make the ADF more representative of the broader community in terms of gender and cultural background. For example, there's a big opportunity to be had with women only accounting for only 13% of the full-time ADF, and female workforce participation rates set to rise in the coming decades.

Where the ageing of the population really becomes important is via its fiscal impact. Treasury's 2002 Intergenerational Report projected that by 2042 the gap between Federal revenues and spending will rise to 5% of GDP due to a number of factors including growing health and age related spending. This assumed explicitly that defence spending would account for 2% of GDP. So how safe is this assumption? There are several factors driving defence costs. Salaries continue to grow faster than inflation, just as they do in the wider economy. As do the medical and housing costs which the ADF has to cover. But the biggest cost driver is the rising cost of acquiring and operating successive generations of increasingly high-tech military equipment, which is growing by at least 4% in real terms. We've modelled the impact of these factors and our best estimate is that, by mid-century, defence spending will have increased almost three-fold. This implies that defence's GDP share will grow only slightly to a bit over 2% once Australia's projected economic growth is taken into account. However, if we allow more pessimistic assumptions about the rate of costs increases, this quickly rises to beyond 3% of GDP.

As a result, defence spending is unlikely to lessen, and may even worsen, the government's financial woes mid-century.

In practice, the emerging fiscal gap will force policy changes in the coming years: it's simply not possible to run an ever-increasing fiscal deficit year after year. No area will be immune from the imperative to contribute to a balanced budget, including defence. Given the long lead-times for defence capability, we need to be looking now for ways for Defence to deliver military capability more efficiently.

Defence has undertaken, or rather has had imposed on it, a number of efficiency initiatives over the past fifteen years, including the Commercial Support and Defence Reform Programs. However, Defence currently has little incentive to do more with less. While large private sector firms routinely have to reduce their costs by hundreds of millions of dollars in response to economic pressures and market competition, defence can always go back to government with a list of so-called 'budget shortfalls'.

One of the key reasons for this is that Defence has an internal demand economy not unlike the old Soviet Union. While the service chiefs are responsible for delivering their respective military capabilities, they can hardly be held fully to account when much of their logistics, administrative support and workforce are managed by others over whom they have little control. It's matrix management on a \$16 billion a year scale and all the dispersed accountability it implies.

With this in mind there are two things that can be done to improve the prospects of Defence delivering real and enduring productivity gains:

- The efficiency with which military capability is being delivered needs to be measured and goals set for its improvement. This should include benchmarking against foreign militaries and comparable commercial entities.
- Give the service chiefs full control over the resources they need to deliver their military capability, and make them fully accountable through incentives and sanctions for delivering that capability.

What might we expect from such an approach? A simple comparison with two big Australian companies is revealing. Last year, Qantas had annual expenses of \$11 billion and plans to deliver savings over the next two years of around \$1 billion. Telstra had annual expenses of \$16 billion and has set a two-year savings target of \$700 million.

Defence has expenses of \$16 billion and has no plans to deliver any net savings in the future – aside from \$50 million per annum for internal redirection. Perhaps it's time that Defence was run like a business.

MEDALS
Court or Swing Mounted
Commemorative Medal Framing
(Sample in RUSI-SA Office)
Diplomas & Certificates Framed

Contact the RUSI Office or
CMDR Tony Bennett, OAM, RFD, ED, RANR
20 Mawson Crescent, Lockleys, SA 5032
Telephone: (08) 8356 3384

LUNCHEON ADDRESS 3rd May 2004
Air Commodore Graham Bentley
Australian Defence Force Involvement
In the Rehabilitation of Iraq

Having taken over from Brigadier Maurie McNarn in May last year I arrived in the Iraq theatre a few weeks after the end of hostilities. I had an early opportunity, and made the decision, to relocate and consolidate our National Headquarters close to the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) headquarters, which was to be the one responsible for the ongoing rehabilitation of Iraq. This would enable us to keep up to date with what was planned and to maintain close liaison with the coalition forces.

Most of you would be aware that we had approximately 1,000 people in the theatre over the period of my command, of which about 200 – 300 were in Iraq. When I arrived, Operation Falconer was still running.

A Few General Observations.

In general, there was little damage done to the majority of the buildings and infrastructure in Iraq. The main destruction centred on the places of the former regime's power – government buildings, military bases and palaces. There were very few bridges or roads attacked, but there was a lot of evidence of destroyed Iraqi military weapons and equipment. The people in Baghdad were generally very happy and supportive of our presence, especially in the early days. The Australian presence in Baghdad was mainly concentrated in three main areas: the airport, about 20km to the west of town; the main headquarters area, just to the east of the airport, more commonly referred to as Camp Victory or Presidential Palace North, but under the old regime known as the Al Faw palace, and finally in a large semi finished building near the Australian representative office near the centre of town. The conditions were harsh, with constant dust storms and temperatures in the 40's and 50's – I can remember playing volleyball in 58 degrees! We lived on ration

packs, and very much in a communal environment. However morale was very high throughout and it was something that was noticed by all those who visited. In the later part of my time we managed to get air conditioning and fresh food. Initially, the centre of Baghdad was fairly quiet - not many cars on the streets nor businesses open, but by the time I left there were traffic jams, roadside stalls and numerous businesses operating.

The Security Situation

The security situation changed gradually throughout the time I was there. The enemy changed their tactics in an attempt to overcome the superior forces on the ground and in the air. They also changed in response to the changes in tactics of the coalition force as the threat changed. Throughout, the most likely attack was an indirect attack, either by roadside improvised explosives, mortars or rocket. The use of suicide car and truck bombs also evolved. Overall there was a general increase in the numbers of attacks but on the whole these attacks were more prone to occur in the area to the north and northwest of Baghdad – the infamous Sunni Triangle.

Much has been made of Australia's zero casualty rate. There are number of reasons for this tremendous achievement. We are a well-trained, well-prepared and well-equipped force. We have also had a lot of experience in peace making/peace keeping over a number of years. As a result, I believe our force protection standards were slightly higher than most, especially to begin with. I must also add that we were lucky, but I also consider the way we operated contributed to our luck. And, of course, we did not have a large number of personnel constantly exposed to frontline threats.

Rehabilitation of Iraq.

There is much to be done before Iraq will have the ability to manage its own affairs without help from the international community. It must be remembered that the ruling process in Iraq ceased at the end of the war and had to be slowly rebuilt. Some examples may highlight some of the problems. As part of the process to rid the country of the former regime, members of the Ba'athist party were prohibited from holding influential positions in the new system. What this did was drastically limit the availability of local people who understood the workings of government. What must also be remembered is that over 70% of the people in Iraq are under thirty and have no knowledge of any other system of government other than Saddam's regime. Therefore, the inability to find people experienced in government service and to act as freethinking middle managers restricted the rate at which progress could be made. Added to this problem was the very limited tenure of personnel in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) resulting in a short-

term focus. This was also exacerbated by the immediacy of effort to restore some semblance of normalcy back to the country. This dichotomy was particularly evident in work on resource and infrastructure restoration. Therefore, there was initially a lack of strategic planning which created numerous unintended problems, mainly to do with resource prioritization, none more prominent than the ongoing effort to employ and involve Iraqis in the rehabilitation process. However, by the time I left, most ministries, departments and the CPA had some form of strategic plan in place.

Other major efforts for personnel in the CPA were re-writing Iraqi law, introducing new laws and ensuring that everything that was done was within the bounds of international law and the associated UN conventions that not all members of the coalition were signatories to. Fortunately, we had a very good legal person attached to the CPA, who had been involved in numerous similar circumstances. He became a very influential person within the CPA and was instrumental in not only ensuring Australian interests were well served but also that international law was well considered.

The Political Process.

The political process progressed significantly during the period. The formation of the Interim Governing Council, or IGC as it was known, provided both positive and negative aspects to progress. Its formation forced the realisation that there needed to be a well-defined transition period and process for return of power to the Iraqis. It also created problems with the IGC. There was much debate on the make up of the group and the process of having a rotating president for short periods. In general, the Council worked and mostly reached consensus on the way forward. On the whole, I believe all members had the interests of the majority of Iraqis in mind. Further, there was strong evidence at the local levels that democratic processes were preferred – most wanted elections for mayors and other local officials and fought strongly against the idea and process of appointed people.

Local People.

I was fortunate to be able to travel around the country. There was only one occasion when I didn't receive a positive response with waves, smiles and discussions with locals. Most knew of Australia and very much appreciated our involvement in the war. The most uplifting time I had was during a visit to one of my senior personnel in Al Hillah. He was responsible for the management of approximately \$US20 million in projects. These ranged from having basketball courts cemented to reconstruction of schools and council buildings. We visited one school in a small town near Al Hillah where an improvement project was about to start. The

children were almost out of control with excitement. The teachers and local officials were also very thankful for the efforts.

The Infrastructure

The biggest problem with facilities such as power stations, sewerage plants, pipelines and transmission lines was the long standing neglect and, in particular, a lack of ongoing maintenance. The next major issue was the continued direct sabotage of these facilities by those opposed to the new regime and by neighbouring countries. Many of the generators and turbines in the power stations were constantly breaking down but, because of the electricity shortages, they initially could not be taken off-line for extended periods. By the autumn, as the temperatures fell, a substantial maintenance program was instigated. (There were also agreements reached with neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, to supply additional electricity to meet power requirements.) There was a gradual improvement with the oil industry, which began to pump a significant proportion of oil through the southern offshore facilities into super tankers.

The Future

Iraq has very good access to resources and the two most important ones are water and oil. Oil will provide the wealth for the country and water will enable the country to feed itself. The people in general are industrious and there is a solid middle class of well-educated people – it was quite amazing to meet a large number of people who had completed post tertiary education in the USA and other places. It was also very re-assuring to see universities in Al Hillah and Sulamanayah very quickly back up and running. In general, schools were well attended. Tourism could be another major winner for the country – there is a large amount of history associated with Iraq and places such as Babylon should draw people. It will take time for the political process to develop and for the security situation to stabilise, but I think both will settle eventually.

LIBRARY NON FICTION

MILITARY STRESS AND PERFORMANCE

Edited by George F. Kearney

The specialist of military psychology has a long and honourable tradition in the Australian Defence Force. Indeed, until recently it has been the experience of every potential Army recruit that one of the first uniformed people encountered on beginning a military career was a psychological examiner administering a battery of tests or a psychologist conducting an interview. To some extent this image of military psychology has almost attained the status of folklore among serving members and the general public. However, because

the ADF fundamentally relies on people, human performance determines the limits of every aspect of what we do. It is, therefore, not surprising that military psychology, focusing on people and how they think, behave, react, and recover, is an increasingly important part of preparing for, and coping with, military operations.

REDCOATS TO CAMS

By Ian Kuring

Reviewed by Malcolm Orchard

As we all know, from small acorns come large oak trees.

The acorn for WO2 Ian Kuring was being given the task, some eight years ago, of compiling a small training pamphlet that briefly spelled out the history of the Infantry Corps. An acorn that grew over those eight years into an oak, as his recently published large, very impressive book, "Redcoats to Cams" stoutly testifies. Here is a particularly fine corporate history of Australian infantry covering the period from the beginning of British settlement in Australia in 1788 until the end of 2001.

This history, however, as its author quietly points out, doesn't tell the story of individuals or specific units, but does tell the story of organisational development and employment of infantry by Australia in war. And he also quietly advises the reader that he has tried to avoid writing a "drums and bugles" history that tells how good Australian infantrymen have been, without acknowledging the problems that have had to be overcome and, in some cases, are still waiting to be dealt with.

Also, as he says by way of preface:

"I have attempted to cover the main events in the development of the infantry as the close combat arm and basis for the combat organisation of the Australian Army. My description of campaigns, operations and battles are not intended to be complete or balanced accounts, but have been written to highlight participation by Australian infantry units. In some cases, a greater amount of descriptive detail has been provided, to highlight what I consider to be important events or developments."

WO2 Ian Kuring has been a member of the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Infantry Corps since 1965, with 34 years' service in the Regular Army, including operational service in South Vietnam during 1970-71 and trip to Somalia in 1993. Also during this service, he has been curator of the Infantry Museum at Singleton (1985-90 and 2000-01) and a member of the Army History Section in Canberra (1993-95). He retired from the Regular Army in August 2001 and is currently a member of the Army Reserve employed part-time as a Research Officer with Army history Unit.

General Peter Cosgrove, AC, MC, Chief of the

Australian Defence Force has said of *From Redcoats to Cams*:

"Ian has managed to capture some telling insights into the practice of Infantry work, the Australian way, showing it to be part craft and part profession. His revelation of the scope of change in the Corps, the size of the Infantry organisation in major wars and the huge significance of the citizen soldier in the Australian Infantry will be a surprise to many.....To read this history of the Australian Infantry is to listen to the heartbeat of the Army. Ian Kuring shows us that the heart, strong and true, beats on."

Redcoats to Cams is profusely illustrated with clear maps and a vast array of fine photographs. (One photograph of particular local interest is that of a patrol from the 2/27th Battalion moving along a track from Guys Post in the foothills of the rugged Finisterre Range in the Ramu Valley in November 1943.....)

It is most certainly a valued addition to the RUSI-SA Library.

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN PROFILE CENTENARY EDITION 2000

This book is a celebration of the Centenary of the Australian Army and marks the achievements over the last one hundred years.

LIBRARY HOLDINGS – WORKING PAPERS BEYOND BAGHDAD, ASPI's Strategic Assessment 2004

LIBRARY – FICTION

Thank you to those members who have donated these books to our Library – their contributions are very much appreciated.

AFTERMATH by Peter Robinson
WASHINGTON & CAESAR
by Christian Cameron

MEDALS – MEMENTOS & MORE

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