"Global War on Terrorism -
ADF's Contribution"
by
Major General Michael Hindmarsh AM CSC
Special Operations Commander - Australia
4 April 2005
I will talk today about the ADF's contribution to the Global War on Terrorism. As Commander of Special Operations I have a leading role within Defence in coordinating the ADF's efforts with the other key commonwealth agencies, because the winning of this war clearly will lie in a multi-dimensional cooperative effort. As our Prime Minister has said 'The war on terror is a different kind of war. It is a war against loose networks, neither dependent on nation-state sponsors, nor responsive to conventional deterrents.' Thus an unconventional war requires an unconventional approach.
Mao once wrote that the strength of the guerrilla or the insurgent was his ability to move indistinguishably amongst the population like a fish does in the sea. Of course the sea that he spoke of is now a global one. The guerrilla, the terrorist, the criminal of the globalized and increasingly interconnected world now has little to constrain him from swimming freely internationally. And policing this vast terrorist and criminal habitat is difficult, particularly when the array of nations who would provide the policing have differing capabilities and divergent views on what should be done to counter the threat. Moreover, the insurgents in many respects have strategic advantage; they have few of the constraints that we have to deal with. Hate, fanaticism and greed provide a common and international currency, which fuels their global proliferation and allows them to circumvent cultural, religious, ideological, ethnic and physical barriers. We on the other hand have to play within a set of rules and adhere to the accepted values of a civilised and law abiding world. And herein lies the challenge for us; how to defeat insidious and free ranging transnational threats in the face of these inherent constraints? How to overcome divergent national priorities and views and pull together collectively for the regional and global good? How to fight back without losing our own civilised identity?
The fundamental difference between terrorist groups of the 70's and terrorist groups of today is the way they are now linking together to form, what I would call a global franchise of terrorism. 'Each regional group uses its own culturally specific model but predominantly links towards a global Islamist insurgency or campaign. This worldwide pattern of Islamist militancy appears to function through regional 'theatres of operation', where terrorist organisations from neighbouring countries cooperate and support each other. There is strong evidence to suggest that Islamist groups within theatres conform to al Qa'eda ideology and strategy, and share a common operational and tactical style. But there is no clear evidence that al Qa'eda directs the jihad in each theatre. Indeed, the global terrorist threat appears to have several complex networks, not one hierarchical organisation.
Terrorist operations develop through systems of sponsorship and patronage. Al Qa'eda provides finance, targeting data and expertise, while local groups gather and share intelligence. An example of this cooperation can be seen in JI's plot to bomb targets in Singapore. This plot was foiled through targeting data discovered in Afghanistan.
Al Qa'eda is not a global jihad headquarters. Within theatres of operations, local actors, issues and grievances exist. Many of these issues and grievances have little connection to the global terrorist campaign, and in fact, may pre-date it by decades or centuries. For example, there have been Moro separatists in the Philippines for several hundred years. But now, through the "franchising phenomenon", a new class of theatre-level actors has emerged. These actors do have links to a global campaign and often act as allies or affiliates of al Qa'eda - in general, al Qa'eda does not deal with local insurgents directly, but through regional proxies.
Clearly there is strength and synergy in a cooperative and collaborative approach in fighting these terrorist groups. But just as we gain strength through building a web of cooperation so do the terrorist organisations gain strength through linking to a global terrorist effort - indeed one could argue that the only truly globalized organisation in the world is terrorism.
Our region has to that it does not allow separate terrorist organisations to gain strength through developing links with each other. I must prevent local issues linking to the global insurgent system and must deal with local insurgents in isolation. However to be successful, this strategy does not demand the pacification of every insurgent in the region. It only demands that the links between regional terrorist organisations and to global groups be disrupted and severed. The region should collectively aim to marginalize groups like Abu Sayyaf and the Moro National Liberation Front that link into global terrorism, and deal with them from a regional and national, but collaborative perspective.
In a practical sense this campaign of de-linking this global threat can be achieved by the close cooperation and collaboration from agencies within a nation's government and from like agencies between governments.
No country possesses all the capabilities and the personnel to be able to conduct the full spectrum of operations that are necessary to meet all these challenge and nations must cooperate if headway is to be made.
With this understanding of the terrorist threat let me turn to how the ADF is reducing the threat of terrorism in the region and contributing to the ability of regional neighbours to provide this military capacity to deal with this insurgency.
The ADF's role in reducing terrorism in our region has been small but significant. The ADF has focused on developing the skills of regional neighbours to deal with the terrorist threat within their own borders but is also prepared to support their efforts when requested. We have concentrated on developing the technical capabilities and tactical techniques through various multilateral and bilateral exercises and exchanges.
In the past year the ADF conducted numerous exercises and exchanges in the region focusing on defeating terrorism.
In example, in October it participated in a multinational exercise in Tokyo Bay, Japan. Team Samurai was a Proliferation Security Initiative that focused on developing technical capabilities and tactical techniques to interdict shipping which may be suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Here the Royal Australian Navy and elements of Special Operations Command worked with the Japanese Coast Guard and Maritime Protection Agency, the United States Navy and elements of the French Navy. The exercise was deemed very successful from the observing 20 nations and considered to be a step forward in hindering the proliferation of WMD's.
And also in October the Incident Response Regiment conducted a joint chemical, biological and radiological response exercises with the Singaporean Armed Forces in Singapore. Exercise Black Orchid, demonstrated Australia's ability to deploy internationally to assist regional neighbours when requested and also provided a good opportunity to exchange procedures and techniques for dealing with terrorism.
Also Exercise Wyvern Sun 04 in Thailand was another successful activity where a Special Air Service Regiment Tactical Assault Group deployed for a three week period to exercise alongside the Royal Thai Military Forces to resolve a complex hostage rescue scenario. The value of this exercise is clearly evident with the understanding we now have of the Thai military response capability and mechanisms. With this knowledge, the Australian government is now in a position to be able to offer targeted assistance at an appropriate level should it be requested.
In June 2004, Australia hosted the first Regional Special Forces Counter Terrorism Conference. This conference brought together senior Special Forces and counter-terrorism experts from Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan, Brunei, Thailand and the United States. It provided the opportunity for senior officials from throughout the region to establish links and share information about national counter-terrorism response mechanisms and the capabilities of Special Forces counter-terrorism units.
So what have these activities and cooperation forums achieved? The ADF has assisted our regional neighbours develop technical capabilities and tactical techniques for countering the threat of terrorism. This includes equipment and training exchanges as well as inter-country exercises to test the response mechanisms of national Governments to a terrorist incident.
Here it would be remiss of me not to note the significant contribution that other nations have made to our capabilities through these regional cooperation programs. Further more, these activities have also brought significant knowledge back to Australia. We have discovered new ways of dealing with some complex tactical and operational issues, a greater understanding of terrorist groups, and a greater understanding of our regional partner's efforts to combat terrorism.
Over the last few years there have been significant enhancements to the Defence counter-terrorism capability.
The ADF has raised a second Tactical Assault Group, TAG East, in Sydney to complement the existing Tactical Assault Group based in Perth. TAG East is fully manned and operational, giving the ADF the capability to respond to two major terrorist incidents in Australia simultaneously.
The Incident Response Regiment met its first development milestone to respond to chemical, biological and radiological incidents in January 2004 and has recently proved itself operationally in Iraq.
Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) has been raised in Sydney, with Special Operations Headquarters now fully manned and operational. SOCOMD combines the expanded ADF Special Forces capabilities, streamlines command, control and coordination of ADF Special Operations Forces, and provides for better linkages for Defence into the whole-of-Government counter-terrorism response.
We are continuing to work with industry and in particular major companies within the aviation and the petrochemical sectors. I know that Defence has gained significantly from the experience of working closely with industry; we have been exposed to a variety of planning considerations by training in complex and hazardous industrial environments.
The ADF, together with intelligence organisations, police forces and other agencies,- provide layered security framework as the most effective response to today's threats.
Finally, let me mention the importance of national character. To my mind the war on terrorism is not primarily a test of military technology or of the delivery of social services and security. It's a test of character. For without strength of national character all other initiatives will be defeated in detail by an enemy who is not hamstrung by morals, rules and time lines. We need to match our adversaries' conviction and clarity of purpose and show that we are more dedicated to protecting civilised life than terrorists are to taking it. In this regard Defence remains firmly committed.