Transcript

Reshaping the Australian Defence Forces
A presentation to the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria

by Aldo Borgu
Program Director, Operations and Capability Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

The changed strategic environment Over the past ten years the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been gradually moving its focus from territorial defence to one of expeditionary operations. This has been occurring amidst a global trend that has seen most Western armed forces do likewise, not least after the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of new security challenges. For Australia two particular events served as the basis for accelerating these moves. The first was the lack of military response options the Government had in making an Australian contribution to Operation Desert Fox - the 1998 military coalition meant to pressure Saddam Hussein to adhere to the UN weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspection regime. The second event was the 1999 East Timor intervention, which exposed our limitations in being able to project and sustain substantial ground forces beyond our shores. As a result the Government developed the 2000 Defence White Paper which was meant to fix the gaps these operations exposed and give us the best-balanced force that we were prepared to pay for at the time. Of course since the White Paper was released the world is supposed to have irrevocably changed with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2002. But ever since that day Defence has struggled to come to terms with what the new strategic environment actually means for the Australia's strategic policy and the future development of the ADF. Defence began work on a new Strategic Assessment some weeks before 9/11 and it wasn't until February 2004 with the release of the new Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that this process of review was seen as somewhat complete. Part of the reason for Defence's difficulties may have been undue influence of the US approach to counter terrorism. The fact that the initial US policy response to combating terrorism was predominantly military in nature - though some would say it still dominates US thinking - as evidenced in Afghanistan and Iraq may have influenced Australian strategic thought to mistakenly follow that approach. If so it ignores the fact that that Australia's war on terror is not the same as the US. We don't have the luxury of using military force the way that the world's only superpower does. And Indonesia is not the same as Afghanistan. But it also ignores the fact that readily identifiable terrorist targets that allow for the use of military force are rapidly disappearing. As the US 9/11 Commission found out, after Afghanistan the scope for military action is quite limited. Combating terrorism requires a political, not military strategy. The 2003 Iraq war that has probably confirmed the reality of what the Government and Defence have decided the changed world means for the ADF. Namely they seemed to have concluded that the increased threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation means that the ADF will be required to be more involved in US-led coalition operations than ever before. But more on that issue a little later. Australia's strategic policy debate Since the Minister for Defence made a speech to the Australian Defence College in June 2002, apparently distancing himself from the prevailing defence strategy of the past two decades, there's been a fairly vigorous debate on the future directions of Australia's strategic policy. But to date the debate has been largely rooted in the issues and personalities of the 1980s. The substance of the debate so far has been based on simplistic notions of geography, namely whether the ADF should be structured for the defence of Australia and regional contingencies or for expeditionary operations in support of the US globally. Hence it's been a debate of false choices. It's also been somewhat of a rhetorical debate. Few substantial changes have been offered or suggested to our current force structure and capability plans by those who would change Australia's current defence policy. The arguments of those so-called proponents of change are also inconsistent to say the least. For example, those who would down play or denigrate the importance of "defence of Australia" are the same individuals who highlight the importance of force structuring the ADF to combat the threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But emphasising these twin threats actually give rise to a newfound importance of the "defence of Australia". · Potential terrorist attacks on the Australian mainland have given a new found emphasis to homeland security - "defence of Australia" by any other name. · While policy priority in developing missile defences may emphasise operational systems to defend deployed troops, the Government's statements also indicate that future systems will see increasing emphasis on systems used to defend potential targets on the Australian mainland, again a "defence of Australia" concept. In any event the issue appeared to have been brought to rest when the Government's November 2003 Defence Capability Review suggested that the Government is moving towards placing the defence of Australia and regional requirements as equal priorities with respect to force structure decisions. That sentiment was echoed by the Government's recently released Terrorism White Paper which stated that "it is in our own region where Australia has its greatest commitment and contribution to make" in combating terrorism. So much for geography no longer mattering. The fact is that the defence of Australia could never really be separated from the security of our immediate neighbourhood. But despite this apparent clarification in Government thinking there still continues to be a sense of disconnect between our strategic policy and capability investment decisions. It's not clear how the ADF's new force priorities relate to these geographic realities. Nor is it clear how they relate to the nature of the new threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. So what does all of this mean in reality for Australia's strategic policy? The future direction of our strategic policy really comes downs to three key issues. Terrorism isn't the only threat we'll face The most likely and serious threats to Australia's security and strategic interests over the next decade and beyond won't be just asymmetric in nature. Given the size of the US military and defence budget its easy to say that all of America's future wars will be asymmetric, as no one can possibly compete with them on the same level. But unlike the US Australia faces a number of possible and feasible threats across a broad capability spectrum over the next 10-20 years and beyond. And in contrast to the US we can't be assured of military superiority in those circumstances. Just because the conventional military threat to the Australian continent is negligible - and has been for some time - doesn't mean that Australia can't or won't be threatened with conventional military force over the next decade or so. Nation states remain the basic building block of the international system, competition between them remains an underlying reality, and modern capable armed forces equipped for high-end warfare remain indispensable. East Timor underlined that reality. And military modernisation is still proceeding at a pace in the Asia Pacific, especially with respect to air and maritime capabilities. Despite the Government's rhetoric to the contrary, only states have the destructive power required to destroy other states. Geography does still matter The threat of terrorism does not mean that all of our security interests have become globalised. Australia's security has recently been deeply affected by a new set of interconnected global security issues. They are international terrorism, WMD proliferation, and state failure. But our security environment is shaped by the interaction of these global trends which much older more durable regional trends. Terrorism is a global issue but for Australia it is inextricably tied up with the problems of the future stability of our neighbours, particularly Indonesia. WMD is a global issue, but for Australia it immediate relevance rests in North Korea. And state failure is a problem that is most important among the small states of the South Pacific. Contributing to coalitions Australia doesn't necessarily need to be able to make large land force contributions to coalition operations beyond our immediate neighbourhood in order to meet our alliance responsibilities to the US. And it's not entirely clear whether the Government actually wants the option to do so. Air, maritime and Special Forces have been our contributions to such operations to date and Government statements seem to confirm that will remain the case. But it is clear that Australia does require the ability to deploy and sustain a brigade-sized land force (around 3500 personnel) for a protracted conflict irrespective of where that deployment occurs, and the capabilities of that formation shouldn't be limited just to low-level conflict or peacekeeping. With a current order of battle of just five infantry battalions we simply can't meet that requirement at present, at least not for more than a single short-term deployment and not without jeopardising the ability to respond to other contingencies. That means the size and capability of the Australian Army needs to be increased. The real issues for debate should be by how much and in what way. But rather than leading the charge on the issue Army seems to be at the forefront of down playing the need for additional troops. Army might believe that pushing for more troops will put them at odds with the government's position. It may well be that the Army is concerned that additional troops will increase the personnel cost burden on their share of the defence budget and risk future modernisation programs, particularly Chief of Army's "hardening and networking the Army" initiative. But all the best technology in the world is pointless if you don't have enough people to do the job required. The current insurgency in Iraq is a good demonstration of that fact. The real lessons of 2003 Iraq war The relative ease in which the US and its coalition allies secured the overthrow of Saddam's regime has led a number of commentators and policy makers to point to that war as somehow demonstrating a new revolutionary form of warfare. The advent of this new from of war is supposed to lead to a transformation in the way defence forces are structured, equipped and fought. Network centric warfare (NCW) uses advances in information technology to link all elements of the military into a highly integrated network that shares information and enables the delivery of more effective military force. It's become the new buzzword in Defence capability circles. Why the Iraqis lost However while the better use of information warfare and connectivity were important factors in the coalition's successes, they didn't amount to a revolution in the way the war was fought. The Iraq war was still fought on predominantly conventional terms against a largely conventional enemy. It had just as much to do with the industrial age as it has with the information age. The more enthusiastic advocates of NCW also need to consider the following points that place the US victory in some considerable perspective. · The Iraqi army was half the strength it was in 1991 and realistically it had no air or maritime capability worth considering. · Some twelve years of sanctions meant Iraq couldn't restore or rebuild any of its previous military capability. · Iraqi had been subjected to air strikes for well over a decade prior to the initiation of hostilities and the Coalition had total air superiority during the campaign. · Iraq's overall strategy and quality of leadership - both political and military - was poor and deeply flawed. Operationally Iraqi tactics performed likewise. · The Iraqi military had more experience in killing its own citizens and fighting against poorly equipped regional neighbours that it did fighting a modern combat force. These factors aren't certain to be replicated in the conflicts the US will face in the future, let alone contingencies the ADF may be required to respond to. So while some commentators might believe that it was US speed of command and action which made the Iraqis appear to be incompetent, it was far more likely the Iraqi's incompetence that actually made them both appear and act incompetent. NCW and low intensity conflict In fact the current difficulties the US has in dealing with the insurgency demonstrates the limits of the NCW as applied to some of the forms of warfare we will face. NCW may provide huge advantages in platform-based conflict in simple environments such as the air and maritime environments. It also has some useful applications to lower-intensity land conflicts. But the current guerilla war in Iraq demonstrates that technology is no substitute to having the adequate numbers of boots on the ground, let alone compensating for the lack of a strategy. The US may not need relatively large numbers of forces to invade, fight and win conventional conflict, but it does need them to stabilise and rebuild countries once invaded. We shouldn't kid ourselves that a networked company-sized group of soldiers has the same capabilities in this kind of operation as a good old-fashioned - but unfashionable - battalion of infantry, or a networked battalion the same capabilities as a legacy brigade and so on. The government's November 2003 Defence Capability Review (DCR) saw an increased requirement to position the ADF to exploit current and emerging NCW advantages. Defence's NCW Road Map has still yet to be released so details as to how NCW will be applied to the ADF are still sketchy. But a number of the cuts and rebalancing in the DCR seem to stem from the NCW principle that you can get the same level of capability or greater through the networking of a reduced number of systems and people. This remains one of the bigger risks in the implementation of NCW - it will result in even smaller forces than we have now. That's the great seduction of NCW to politicians and policymakers alike - offering the possibility of a smaller force structure and less numbers of troops which then leads to less cost overall. This doesn't mean that many of the principles behind NCW aren't worth pursuing, indeed many of them have roots in military reform and innovation efforts going back decades. After all a joint approach to warfare is all about networking, as is a combined arms approach. But we do need to recognise the limitations and risks associated with elevating and adopting NCW as a central and strategic concept to the possible exclusion of other military innovations. In fact our problems really begin at the conceptual level. Defence currently follows two concepts in its capability planning, NCW and Effects Based Operations (EBO). Despite EBO being all about gaining a strategic outcome we seem to focus on the concept at an operational level. And despite NCW demonstrating its worth as an operational and tactical concept, we seem to have elevated it to be a strategic concept to guide the development of our defence force. In effect we've got them the wrong way around. Rather than talk about effects based operations we should be talking about effects based warfare (EBW). And rather than NCW we would emphasise network centric operations (NCO), or preferably network enabled operations (NEO), which curiously is where the ADF first began some years ago before they were overtaken by the latest US fad. Ultimately with respect to NCW we need to focus on the networking, rather than the network. We shouldn't kid ourselves either that speed of manoeuvre and information superiority can replace or compensate for mass of numbers and force protection. NCW and interoperability I mentioned previously the increased importance placed by the Government on being more broadly interoperable with the US. NCW is also held up as a necessity to maintain interoperability with the US. This raises two important issues. The first is that the future challenge of maintaining interoperability is not so much a challenge of widening gulf in military capability, differing levels in respective defence budgets or access to technology - though they all have an important part to play. The greater challenge - and one that doesn't get much attention - is the US willingness or otherwise to let us into the network, let alone access to the technology to make the network work. Even in the recent Iraq War the ADF still faced numerous obstacles in getting access to US classified operational networks, even when it may have affected our ability to properly execute our mission. The second is that despite Defence's rhetoric that inter-ADF interoperability has a greater priority than coalition interoperability there is a risk that the individual services of the ADF will become more networked with their respective sister services in the US military than with each other. Our contribution to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq underlines this possibility. Our contributions may have been balanced but they were not joint in operation. In fact we operated more jointly with US services in Iraq and Afghanistan than with each other. Defence capability and a new White Paper Since the release of the 2000 Defence White Paper the Government has undertaken a number of reviews - of strategy and capability - in an attempt to address the defence implications of Australia's changed circumstances. The Governments February 2003 Defence Update, Australia's National Security identified terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs as two new defining issues for defence and strategic policy - and by implication for ADF force structure. However it did so without detailing what the role of the ADF is in combating these threats, let alone how the ADF should be reshaped to respond, other than to suggest we'll be more involved in US led coalition operations. The release of the Defence Capability Review in November 2003 and the Defence Capability Plan 2004-14 in February 2004 gave Government the opportunity to come up with such details. However any objective analysis of the re-balancing of defence capability and expenditure will reveal that changes to ADF capability resulting from these plans and reviews do little if anything to aid Australia's campaign against terrorism or WMDs. When pressed on the issue the Government falls back on its often-stated list of defence capability enhancements to combat terrorism such as: · raising a second tactical assault group; · expansion of the ADF's chemical, biological and radiological response capability; · expansion of Special Forces numbers by some 300; and &; the establishment of Special Operations Command as the new operational headquarters for Special Forces deployments. However these achievements were all approved and funded before the re-balancing of the Defence Capabmiddotility Plan was approved, let alone released. In any event their investment value pales next to a $15 billion annual defence budget and $50 billion 10-year defence capital investment program. And finally the list of enhancements to Special Forces in particular ignores the fact that we simply don't use the SAS and Commandos the way the US does, especially with respect to their role in combating terrorism. If the Government was truly serious in expanding the role the ADF has in combating terrorism then it could do well to consider the following: · Transferring domestic tactical assault responsibilities to Federal and State police forces thereby freeing ADF Special Forces for counter-terrorist operations off shore · Acquisition of dedicated Special Forces helicopters and accompanying refuelling aircraft to give them the operating ranges they need. · Acquisition of strategic airlift aircraft which the head of Special Operations Command has highlighted in the past as a capability gap. · Giving ADF Reserves a more serious and substantive role in homeland security tasks beyond an additional nine-day training course to become what could be perceived a glorified security guards. And if protecting deployed Australian troops from weapons of mass destruction is so important it seems strange that the DCR and DCP have effectively cancelled one of the major projects that could provide such defence, the Ground Based Air Defence project to replace our Rapier surface to air missiles. A new White Paper Underlying all of the above is the Government's requirement that Defence must live within its means in the face of rising projects costs and new capability demands continues to call into question Defence's ability to meet the capability goals of the 2000 White Paper. It's clearly evident that after the 2004 election the incoming Government should develop a new Defence White Paper. At that point it will almost have been time for a new paper anyway. But an unambiguous link needs to be re-established between Australia's strategic policy, the ADF's capability priorities and the Government's financial commitment to Defence. That link does not appear to exist at present. In fact our present capability development process seems to be more symptomatic of individual Service wish lists being approved without any consideration of a more strategic and corporate Defence-wide approach. A link also needs to be established in placing our Defence White Paper within the parameters of a broader National Security Strategy. The priority and focus of this new white paper should be to sustain and enhance our capacity for independent military operations in our own region. Fighting in coalitions is not the only form of military operation the ADF will have to prepare for. The Government cannot afford to structure the ADF on the assumption that future military operations will only - or even predominantly - involve either the ADF assisting the US in global operations or the US assisting us in more regional military operations. And the starting off point should be to develop new force structuring principles for the future development of the ADF, based on some of the principles developed for the 2000 White Paper. Most of the current debate on force structure determinants for the ADF continues to be centred on narrow geographic functions, namely whether we should structure the ADF for defence of Australia or for expeditionary operations. That's a false choice because we need to be able to do both, often at the same time. The "defence of Australia" is a vital basis of our defence policy and will remain so. And we're not alone in emphasising the defence of our country as the main mission for our defence forces, after all the US does likewise, even more so after 9/11. But how the concept is used to determine ADF force structure and Defence capability development plans really depends on its underlying assumptions. Part of the problem with the 1980s concept of "defence of Australia" was that it was tied to the warning time concept, which stated that Australia would have at least seven years warning time before a threat could eventuate against us. It was that concept that lead to policy decisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s that resulted in an ADF that wasn't ready for real world contingencies. And despite the popular belief to the contrary, Army wasn't the only Service that suffered as a result. The policies at the time: · Cut the number of regular infantry battalions from six to four and place an increased reliance on Reserves. · Neglected the continuous upgrade of our combat aircraft particularly with respect to their electronic warfare self-protection. · Allowed the policy of procuring naval ships "fitted for but not with" key weapons systems. · Didn't allow for adequate levels of war stocks for key weapons and munitions. · Ignored the importance of logistic support for deployed forces. The "defence of Australia" concept has been limited in the past by focusing on defending Australia against invasion which is far to limiting, let alone unrealistic. Under such an interpretation it can't cater for all of the ADF's likely missions, particularly those requiring a large land force contribution. Rather than stating that forces structured for "defence of Australia" would be adequate for all other likely missions, we need to look at the concept as being the bare minimum - rather than the absolute - we require our defence forces to achieve. Equally we need to recognise that we are a nation of limited defence resources and are not a global player. The Asia Pacific region will always be the region of primary strategic interest to us. Any more global deployments have to be measured against that fact. If the Government wants to become a more global player than it should be prepared to pay for it. No government should be prepared to restructure a defence force for global operations on a budget that has been optimised for predominantly regional roles. So, what then should be the real basis for structuring the ADF to function within the complex and uncertain environment in which we are now faced with? A complex and uncertain strategic environment calls for a flexible and adaptable force structure. That seems to be a statement of the bleeding obvious, but how do you actually build flexibility in as a force structure determinant? Part of the flexibility requirements related to having the right numbers of people and equipment. This relates to the requirement and ability to be able to undertake concurrent operations. The attacks and aftermath of 11 September 2001 highlighted the fact that you need to be prepared to contribute to overseas operations while dealing concurrently with a level of national security threat at home. At the same time we had F/A-18s in Diego Garcia as part of the US campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban we also had F/A-18 performing combat air patrols over the CHOGM meeting here in Australia. This ultimately put a real strain on our air defences. But we couldn't really afford to choose between the two missions. How to structure the ADF The starting off point for future ADF force structure determination should be the principle laid out for the development of our land forces in the 2000 Defence White Paper. This states that the Government "plans to structure the Army to ensure that we will be able to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods, and at the same time maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere." Unlike the goal for land forces, the other capability goals for maritime, air combat, strike and information capability are far more general in nature and not much use as a specific guide to force structuring. They include the requirement to defend our maritime approaches as well as retain our regional competitiveness in air combat. So, using the land forces goal as the basis, the future ADF could be built upon the following principles: · structure the Army to ensure that we will be able to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods able to fight in a medium level conflict, and at the same time maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere. · structure the Navy to ensure we will be able to sustain one major amphibious task group for extended periods and at the same time maintain task force deployments of surface vessels and submarines available elsewhere, similar to our deployments for Operation Relex, Solomon Islands evacuation and the Maritime Interception Force. · structure the Air Force to ensure we will be able to sustain one strike and one air defence task force for extended periods and at the same time maintain an additional air defence task force available for deployment elsewhere. Air Force will also be structured to provide airlift sufficient to support the land force requirements and maritime patrol sufficient to support the naval deployments noted above. · structure our intelligence and surveillance assets and services to be able to support and sustain the above deployments and at the same time provide more strategic assessments for the government. · structure and staff our command and control arrangements to be able to appropriately support and sustain the above deployments. This means the Government needs to assess whether a Headquarters with over 1000 personnel, one three-star and six two-star officers is needed to support operational deployments that rarely number more than 2000. Further enhancements are still likely to be needed to the ADF for it to be able to achieve these goals. It's debateable whether Army currently has the ability or numbers required to undertake the role Government set out for it in December 2000, let alone any expanded role. If concerns about future personnel burdens worry Government that much then they might consider paying for additional battalions by cutting down the numbers of senior officers and headquarters. The Air Force needs to ensure it gets its 100 replacement combat aircraft and doesn't trade off the numbers because of budgetary pressures and the illusions of what networking can offer. It also needs to increase the number of aerial refuelling tankers. In the case of Navy questions have to be asked as to whether acquiring only two large ships can really meet our amphibious capability requirements. But flexibility isn't just a function of quantity. It's also a function of quality, in this case the ability to undertake the widest possible range of military operations across the conflict spectrum. And you can get more flexibility by taking a truly joint approach to force structure and capability development, rather than just a rhetorical approach. You certainly do not gain flexibility by acquiring single role platforms or systems. For example, Defence shouldn't necessarily limit its strategic lift capabilities just to large naval vessels. And the ADF's strike capabilities need not be the predominant domain of the Air Force. Taking this approach would see Defence develop new types of capabilities such as a truly strategic airlift capability as well as long-range land attack capabilities for our naval surface combatants amongst others. And finally it doesn't really matter if you have a flexible and adaptable force structure if you don't have flexible and adaptable leaders and soldiers to equip that force structure. Such a structure would give the government a wider range of response options with which to defend Australia's interests. We need to move Australia's strategic policy debate beyond the divisive nature of a narrow geographic debate with no particular consequences. Precisely where we do these missions doesn't matter quite as much as having the ability to do them in the first place. The fact remains that military operations are by their nature expeditionary, whether they are undertaken in defence of Australia, the region or further afield. We need to accept that fact and move on. Author details: Aldo Borgu is currently Program Director, Operations and Capability, at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), an independent defence and strategic policy institute set up by the Australian Government. There he is responsible for managing and developing ASPI's policy research program on military operations, defence capability and terrorism issues. He also writes as the military analyst for The Daily Telegraph (Australia) newspaper. He is the author of A Big Deal: Australia's Future Air Combat Capability (ASPI 2004), Beyond Bali: ASPI's Strategic Assessment 2002, and Australia's Defence after September 11 (ASPI 2002) as well as a number of articles on defence capability, terrorism, the Iraq war/insurgency and other strategic issues. Prior to joining ASPI, Aldo worked as the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defence, policy officer in the International Policy Division of the Department of Defence and as a strategic analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation. He can be contacted on: Phone: 61 2 6270 5114 Fax: 61 2 6273 9566 Email: aldoborgu@aspi.org.au Address: Level 2, 40 Macquarie St Barton ACT 2600 Australia

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